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Abstract 
South Africa, like most countries world over, has undergone and continues to suffer from urban 
decay in varying stages. The inner city of Johannesburg is considered as one of the most decayed 
cities in South Africa. To this end, urban regeneration strategies based primarily on international 
models have been introduced and implemented in South Africa. The Urban Development Zone 
(UDZ) tax incentive is one such strategy. It was introduced as a post apartheid strategy to 
regenerate the inner cities of 16 municipalities, Johannesburg being one of them, by enhancing 
private investment. This study sought to investigate the perceptions of the stakeholders on the 
impacts of the UDZ tax incentive on property development in Johannesburg inner city. Data 
was collected from a purposively selected group of policy makers (officials from Johannesburg 
Development Agency, JDA, Johannesburg Property Company, JPC and Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality) and property developers active in Johannesburg inner city. The 
findings of the research indicated that property developers were profit driven and the demand 
for built up space in the inner city and potential for rental growth have been the major driving 
force of property development. Since the study sought to explore the views, opinions, 
perceptions and attitudes of the stake holders, the survey research strategy was considered the 
most appropriate method to collect and analyse primary and secondary data. The main finding of 
the survey was that, the stake holders did not consider the UDZ tax incentive as an adequately 
motivating factor to encourage property development in the inner city.  
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Chapter One- Introduction 
 
“We cannot solve our problems with the same level of thinking that we had when we created them” 
Albert Einstein 
1.1 Background 
The city is a dynamic and ever changing environment. According to Bourne & 
Simmons (1976), the urban system is more than a set of interdependent cities: it creates, 
transmits, alters and reflects changes in society as a whole. This can be said to hold true 
for most cities in all economies regardless of their stage of development, it be in 
developed or less developed market based economies. To a large extent, South African 
cities as with all urban areas elsewhere in the world are strategically important as they 
are the most productive sites in the national economy as well areas that accommodate 
the largest number of poor people, (South African Cities Network, n.d.). In this respect, 
it becomes necessary to ensure that urban areas and inner cities are fully functioning 
and well managed.  
Williams (2006) suggests that economic restructuring, suburbanisation of land uses and 
inappropriate policy structures are the main sources of inner-city decline. Power’s 1997 
study (Williams, 2006) adds that weak planning and development policies are a 
common problem leading to urban decay in most European cities. This can be said to 
hold true for African cities as well. In a study carried out by the City of Johannesburg 
(2006), it was found that big global cities with extensive investment in infrastructure, 
were being adversely affected economically by considerable urban decay, dereliction of 
buildings and impoverishment partly caused by increased urban migration (City of 
Johannesburg, 2006). Urban decay or urban decline is a major problem in most cities in 
the world and as put by Hui, Wong and Wan (2006) it is an urban problem that affects 
the physical, economic and social growth of an area. Urban decay can be said to refer to 
the deterioration of buildings and older areas of large cities due to a number of reasons 
such as neglect, crime, change in policies or lack of economic support. To a large extent 
urban decay has no single cause but results from inter-related socio-economic 
conditions (UN Habitat, 2010). 
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South African provincial cities have not been immune to this decline. According to 
Trevor Manuel in his 2003 budget address to the nation (National Treasury, 2003) many 
urban areas in South Africa suffer from inadequate infrastructure maintenance and 
environmental decay. Manuel went on to stress that urban renewal requires greater 
business investment in the regeneration of inner city areas (ibid.). According to a 
research carried out by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), urban 
regeneration seeks ways to improve disadvantaged places and the lives of people who 
live and work in a particular area (RICS, 2003). In this respect, regeneration activities 
can be varied and may reflect joined-up holistic or relatively less integrated programmes 
of physical, social and economic change (ibid.). 
Johannesburg also known as ‘Igoli, the city of gold’ is one of the fastest growing cities 
in Southern Africa. It also has over the years, encountered movements of capital and 
migration, social changes and new innovations. Johannesburg is home to approximately 
3.4 million people (www.statssa.co.za) and 200 000 (5.88%) of these inhabitants reside 
in the inner city, (www.sacities.net) Despite Johannesburg being the largest city in South 
Africa, its inner city is the most decayed (Cox, 2000; Fraser, 2008). The concept of 
urban decay is however not foreign to other South African cites (Fraser, 2008). It is 
widely held by many that urban decay in South African cities can be closely tied to the 
change in political landscape. A research carried out by Silimela Development Services 
(2008) attests that the urban cities of South Africa show a considerable amount of 
inequality and inefficient built environments resulting in urban decay. This inequality 
can be seen in the manner that Johannesburg developed initially as a mining town then 
into an apartheid city and eventually into the economic powerhouse of South Africa 
(Cox, 2000). 
During the colonial period prior to 1948, Johannesburg was faced with influences from 
English, German, French and Dutch immigrants as clearly seen in the construction of 
buildings, (Ramadobu, Kotze & Verster, 2007). The apartheid era (1948 to 1994) had an 
enormous effect on the manner in which the inner city developed (Fraser, 2008). 
Aspects of discrimination were seemingly evident in almost all spheres of life, as certain 
places and facilities were reserved solely for one race. The advert of democracy in 1994 
saw a change in this design and in turn led to the once favoured minority (white 
population) leaving the inner city in an effort to prevent inclusion of all races. 
According to Fraser (2008), many white landlords deserted their buildings. This 
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migration of businesses from the inner city had a negative effect on the income base of 
the municipality as landlords abandoned their buildings and were unwilling to pay rates 
and taxes (Fraser, 2008). This in turn led to banks redlining most of the inner city as 
landlords defaulted on their mortgage repayments. It is believed that this migration was 
the beginning of the inner city decline as businesses moved their offices out of town to 
satellite locations such as Sandton where urban management was well maintained and 
provided by relevant authorities. With reduced income, municipalities were increasingly 
unable to provide much needed services and embark on capital infrastructure projects 
(ibid.).  
To reverse the effects of inner city decline and to maximize efficient utilization of the 
existing infrastructure, the South African government has followed international 
practice and intervened through the introduction of various regeneration strategies (City 
of Johannesburg, 2006). Urban regeneration can be said to refer to the renewal or 
rebirth of an area or location. The concept of urban regeneration includes the 
perception of urban decline in inner city economies, quality of the environment and in 
social life and incorporates the process of renewal to establish the basis for economic 
growth and social well being, (McGreal, Adair, Berry, Deddis and Hirst., 2000; Adair, 
Berry, McGreal, Hutchison, Watkins and Gibb, 2003). McGreal and Berry (2004) agree 
with this and confirm that regeneration concerns the physical and economic renewal of 
locations with development and investment in property a fundamental part of the 
process and product. McGreal et al., (2000) contends that the focus of urban 
regeneration is therefore a response to both the problems and the new demands created 
by economic, social and physical change.  
Some of the regeneration strategies that have been employed in Johannesburg inner city 
include: Improvement Districts (ID’s), the Better Buildings Project (BBP) and the 
Urban Development Zone (UDZ) tax incentive. These strategies can be used 
collectively or as independent regeneration strategies. This is evident in the manner in 
which these strategies have been employed in South Africa. The whole inner city is a 
designated UDZ area. Located within this area, are discreet ID’s where tenants and 
owners pay an additional amount for the provision of services not provided by the 
Municipality. The BBP is a South African innovation to ‘better’ the ‘bad’ buildings 
located within the inner city. The premise of this initiative is that buildings are sold at 
the price owed in rates and taxes or below market value to property investors. 
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This research describes these regeneration strategies but focuses on the UDZ tax 
incentive. The UDZ tax incentive was first introduced during the 2003 National Budget 
and formally legislated in December 2003. This is a tax incentive in respect of the 
erection, extension, addition or improvement of buildings demarcated within Urban 
Development Zones (UDZs) in 16 municipalities in South Africa, including 
Johannesburg. The Income Tax Act (No. 58 of 1962) permits owners or developers to 
write off costs of refurbishment and or new development in demarcated UDZs areas 
(South African Revenue Services, n.d.)  
The UDZ tax incentive has certain features that make it a unique regeneration strategy. 
Firstly, only tax payers who own or refurbish property within the boundaries of the 
zone can claim for it. This has a direct impact on other property owners such as Non- 
Governmental Organisations, (NGO’s) and government bodies. Secondly, an investor 
must have developed or refurbished a minimum area of 1000m2 before he is eligible to 
claim the tax benefit. These features of the tax incentive may pose certain challenges 
that may act as a barrier in encouraging inner city regeneration through private property 
development.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
South African cities have developed and undergone urban decay in a unique context, 
from colonial to apartheid and finally to democratic rule. Owing to this, regeneration 
strategies such as the UDZ tax incentive that has certain distinctive applicability 
requirements may not necessarily be an effective mechanism to redevelop or redress the 
problems of urban decay faced in the inner cities in South Africa such as Johannesburg.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The questions that follow on from the problem statement are: 
 What were the objectives of the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive? 
 What type of property has been developed or refurbished in Johannesburg inner 
city since the introduction of this tax incentive? 
 What indicators are appropriate to investigate or measure the impact of the 
introduction of the tax incentive on property development in Johannesburg inner 
city? 
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 Can these indicators show whether the objectives of the UDZ tax incentive been 
met? 
1.4 Hypothesis 
The study seeks to test the following hypothesis:  
 The introduction of the UDZ tax incentive has had no positive impact on property development in 
 Johannesburg inner city.   
 
1.5 Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to ascertain the perceptions of the impacts and challenges in 
the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive with a view of making it more responsive to 
its objectives. In line with the aim, the following objectives were formulated: 
 To assess the objectives of the UDZ tax incentive and the creation of the urban 
development zones. 
 To investigate what indicators that can be used to assess the impact of the UDZ 
tax incentive. 
 To investigate the types of property development in the inner city as a result of 
the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive.  
 To examine whether the UDZ tax incentive is a motivating factor in the property 
development decision 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
Stake as cited in Denscombe (2008) indicates that time and access for fieldwork are 
almost always limited. Denscombe (2008) agrees with this assertion and indicates that ‘if 
two or more clusters are equally suitable as research sites, it would be crazy to pot for 
ones that were the furthest away without some good reason to do so’. UDZs were 
introduced to revitalise the urban areas of sixteen (16) of the municipalities in South 
Africa, Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality being one of them. The Johannesburg 
inner city is the only demarcated UDZ area within the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality area of jurisdiction.  
Johannesburg is considered the economic capital of South Africa and in line with this, 
the study focuses only on Johannesburg inner city and not any of the other UDZ 
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designated areas in South Africa.  Whilst there are a number of regeneration strategies 
that have been employed to curb the problem of urban decay in Johannesburg inner 
city such as BBP, ID’s and UDZ tax incentive, this research focuses primarily on the 
UDZ tax incentive owing to its unique nature of application. Further, urban 
regeneration strategies are said to promote economic, social and physical enhancement. 
This study is limited to the impacts of the UDZ tax incentive on property development 
(the physical enhancement) and does not take economic or social enhancements into 
account. 
1.7 Research Methods 
The aim of the research methodology employed was to answer the research questions 
highlighted earlier. Qualitative research which is subjective in nature and emphasises on 
meanings, experiences, opinions and descriptions was deemed as the most appropriate 
for this research. This is because qualitative research seeks to discover, explain, 
understand or explore a process and describe the experiences of a particular concept, 
idea or theory. 
In line with this methodology, both primary and secondary data collection instruments 
were used such as expert interviews, structured questionnaires consultations with 
officials knowledgeable in the area of research, desktop survey of documents, journals 
and other published articles. Two survey groups formed the set of interviewees. This 
included officials or policy makers from relevant institutions such as the City of 
Johannesburg & Johannesburg Development Agency and property developers who 
have been active in the inner city since the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive in 
Johannesburg inner city.  
1.8 Structure of the Research Report 
The research report is structured in the following manner: 
 Chapter 1: Introduction: This chapter introduces the research by giving the  
background to the study. It highlights the problem statement, shows the aim and 
objectives, defines the scope and limitations in which the study is carried out and 
lastly highlights the research methods to be employed 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review: This chapter reviews literature on the phenomenon 
of urban decay, history of the renewal or regeneration strategies that has been 
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used in globally and in Johannesburg. The chapter discusses the UDZ tax 
incentive in detail highlighting its history, aims, objectives and manner of 
application. 
 Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology; Owing to the time of research 
undertaken, a qualitative research approach was adopted. This chapter discusses 
this research approach and justifies the methods uses, the sample size in line with 
the data sought. 
 Chapter 4: Research Findings and Analysis: The data collected is collated and 
presented in this chapter. This data is presented in line with the objectives and 
research questions. 
 Chapter 5: Conclusions: Here conclusions are drawn from the data presented in 
the preceding chapter (chapter 4). Shortcomings of the research and areas of 
further research are highlighted. 
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Chapter Two –Literature Review
 
“The inner city revival is a tribute to the past, the celebration of the present and an investment in the 
future”, (Star News Paper, 23 March 2006).  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the published literature on the phenomenon of urban decay, the 
history of urban renewal strategies, such as improvement districts and tax incentives, 
which have been used internationally. This is followed by a brief synopsis of the 
evolution of Johannesburg as a City and the concept of urban decay. The chapter then 
discusses the regeneration strategies that have been used in Johannesburg inner city 
such as Improvement Districts (ID’s), Bad Buildings Programme (BBP) and the UDZ 
tax incentive. The UDZ tax incentive as a regeneration strategy is the thrust of this 
research and in this respect it is discussed in detail reviewing literature on its 
background, its aims and objectives and manner of application. The tax incentive is 
discussed in light of the South African government’s vision of providing an inclusive 
non-racial city. 
2.2 The Phenomenon of Urban Decay and Regeneration 
Cities, neighbourhoods and city centres are important areas and spaces because they 
offer human beings the potential to share urban spaces, participate in public and private 
events and exercise both their duties and their rights, (UN Habitant, 2010). Decay is the 
process of falling into disrepair or deterioration (Oxford Advanced Learners Online 
Dictionary). Urban decay can therefore be said to be the process by which a city or a 
part of a city falls into a state of disrepair and the area may show signs of population 
loss, housing stock deterioration and increases in crime, (Wallace and Wallace, 1990). 
According to Hui et al. (2008) urban decay has been a significant problem for many 
cities worldwide. Williams (2006) suggests that economic restructuring, suburbanisation 
of land uses, and weak planning and development policies are the main sources of this 
inner-city decline. 
Regeneration can be said to refer to the rebirth, renewal, renovation or rejuvenation of 
an area (Oxford Advanced Learners Online Dictionary and Thesaurus). The concept of 
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urban regeneration embodies the recognition of urban decline in inner-city economies, 
decline in the quality of the environment and of social life and incorporates the process 
of renewal to establish the basis for economic growth and social well-being (McGreal et 
al., 2000; Adair et al., 2003).  
McGreal (2004) argues that regeneration concerns the physical and economic renewal 
of locations with development and investment in property as a fundamental part of the 
process and product. In contrast, some other regeneration proponents hold the view 
that the success of regeneration should not be measured by development outputs but 
how the quality of life is enhanced in the areas undergoing regeneration, (Research 
Findings: Investment Property Forum, IPF 2009). 
Williams (2006) contends that the ideal conditions for implementation of urban renewal 
strategies would include a strong economy, adequate public resources and a determined 
commitment to solving urban dereliction problems while achieving social and economic 
progress. It is likened to a three-legged stool that addresses the physical environment, 
local economy and most importantly the community around it, (IPF, 2009). Therefore 
any urban renewal strategy cannot be viewed in isolation. It is a collective effort by all 
major stakeholders. In such circumstances planned improvements to infrastructure, 
transportation and environment should coincide with renewal and new development 
that has the support of all social and economic partners. Therefore, for regeneration to 
be successful, it requires a strategic, broad and long-term approach (IPF, 2009). 
Regeneration often arises where real estate markets are fragile, the private sector is 
cautious about investing and the level of economic activity is in state of decline (Amin 
and Thrift 1995, cited in McGreal and Berry, 2004). This view is shared by McGreal, et 
al. (2000) where the authors contend that the focus of urban regeneration is a response 
to both the problems and the new demands created by economic, social and physical 
change. It has been argued by many that the success of urban regeneration from a 
private perspective has to be supported and facilitated by the public sector (ibid.). In 
these areas of perceived risk and uncertainty, investors require a form of public sector 
intervention to stimulate market activity (McGreal and Berry, 2004). That is to say the 
private sector cannot operate in isolation but needs a public sector framework. Whereas 
the public sector views urban regeneration as an important and vital phenomenon the 
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private sector perceives urban regeneration projects and inner cities to carry 
considerable risk compared to prime property locations (McGreal, et al., 2000). 
2.3 Regeneration Strategies 
Around the world, various strategies have been implemented to regenerate inner cities. 
The selection or choice of strategies used in any country may depend on a number of 
factors such as government policy, social and economic objectives. The literature 
reviewed below will discuss two of the widely used regeneration strategies, namely; 
Improvement Districts (ID’s) and tax incentives. 
2.3.1 Improvement Districts (ID’s) 
The concept of Improvement Districts (ID’s) was initiated in North America in the late 
1960’s as a response to declining levels of municipal service (Cox, 2000). This to a 
greater extent means that ID’s are seen as an ideal reaction to supplement municipal 
services. ID’s can take the form of City Improvement Districts, (CID’s) or Business 
Improvement Districts (BID’s). A BID is defined as follows: 
“A public-private partnership in which businesses in a defined area pay an 
additional tax or fee in order to fund improvements within the district’s 
boundaries” (Ottawa Business Journal, n.d.). 
This view is shared by Cox (ibid.,p.2) who defines an ID as a ‘geographic area in which 
property owners and/or tenants agree to pay for certain services which are 
supplementary to those supplied by local government and which enhance the physical, 
economic and social environment of the area’.  Hogg et al. (2003, p.466) defines BID’s 
as ‘companies permitted to levy a tax on businesses and property owners within a 
specific urban boundary in order that the services in that area may be improved’.  
These two definitions above identify the basic concepts of ID’s or BID’s as being the 
enhancement or improvement of an area principally funded by the property owners or 
businesses within that specific area.  
Guy (2001, in Hogg et al. 2003) indicates that BID’s were initiated when local 
governments were perceived as not providing sufficient basic services such as cleaning, 
safety initiatives and road maintenance. Hogg et al. (2003) goes on to describe BID’s as 
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a business-led response to the decline of down-town areas. BIDs may go by other 
names, such as business improvement area, business revitalization zone, community 
improvement district, special services area, or special improvement district but simply 
put, they are tools or platforms to fund additional services, which improve the vitality 
of urban areas. The property owners or tenants within the area determine the type and 
scope of services that are required (Cox, 2000). 
These services can range from security, cleaning, maintenance, marketing, litter 
collection, maintenance of public space, removal of illegal posters, physical 
improvements and special programmes to address aspects of transportation, access, 
parking, greening and homelessness. The services provided by IDs are supplemental to 
those already provided by the municipality. 
ID’s are viewed as self sustaining instruments that help to maintain, manage and market 
investment in the inner city by addressing physical, environmental, social and economic 
factors. They can be as modest or as ambitious as the businesses want it to be (Hogg, et 
al., 2003). 
2.3.1.1 ID’s in America & the UK 
As previously mentioned, the concept of ID’s has its origin in North America in the 
early 1960’s. One of the earliest established ID is the San Diego programme which 
originated in 1970 and presently includes about 18 individual BID’s and over 11 000 
business partners (Jones et al., 2003). 
In the UK, ID’s were formally legislated in the Labour Government’s Modernising of 
Government White Paper (2001). They were defined in the white paper as partnership 
arrangements through which the local authorities and the local business community 
could benefit (Jones et al., 2003). Jones contends that this was seen as a workable tool 
because ratepayers would be able to decide in advance on the way in which such money 
is spent and how much they are prepared to pay in addition to their rates bill. 
2.3.1.2 Creation of ID’s 
The creation of ID’s should adhere to set standards and is governed by legislative 
framework. According to Hogg, et al. (2003) the standard prerequisite conditions for the 
creation of ID’s are:  
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 A prior agreement by a simple majority of business owners who control the 
 commercial space within an area; 
 A decision regarding the ID’s boundary, (the size is variable); 
 A vote by all businesses within the ID to indicate whether they are willing to be 
 involved or not. 
2.3.1.3 Advantages of ID’s 
The key advantages of ID’s summarised by Cox, (2000) are: concerted efforts are 
directed towards investigating and addressing all issues affecting the neighbourhood; 
enhancement of the environment and strengthening investor confidence by addressing 
safety, cleanliness, economic vitality and strengthening retail and commercial nodes; 
promoting a positive identity of the area; providing private sector management and 
accountability through the establishment of a section 21 (non-profit making) 
management company; continuous monitoring of new developments or interventions 
that affect the area and engaging in continuous consultation with the municipality on 
matters that affect the area. In summary, the main purpose of establishing ID’s is to 
promote the inner city as an attractive investment destination to prospective investors.  
For Cox, (2000) some of the sustainable benefits of ID’s from the perspective of local 
government include: 
 Creation of self sustaining mechanism to maintain, manage and market new 
investments in civic infrastructure for example street scaping or environmental 
upgrade projects; 
 Formation of a unified private sector voice for the ID area; 
 Help in leveraging supplemental services to mitigate declining municipal budgets; 
and  
 ID’s advance revitalisation areas and lead to an increase in sales revenue, property 
values and ultimately municipal budgets. 
2.3.2 Tax Incentives  
One of the primary virtues of tax incentives is that they are seen as the most effective 
means to bridge the gap between the initial estimated cost of development and the 
actual cost of development on completion (Healey, 1995; McGreal, S.W & Berry, N.J., 
2004; Investment Property Forum (IPF), 2009). This is because the cost of 
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development on completion is offset by the tax benefits provided by the incentive. 
Ngwabi (2009) agrees and adds that a tax incentive is a vital tool that is able to 
simultaneously benefit both the private and public sectors. 
An incentive is defined as follows: 
”The direct or indirect cost or benefit that changes behaviour by 
motivating a decision or action by consumers, businesses or other 
participants in the economy which would not have otherwise 
taken place in order to achieve some objective”, Wolpe, Solomon, 
and Rabe, (2008, pg 5). 
Incentives are seen as desirable regeneration strategies as they make property 
investment more attractive, improve property investor confidence, lower property 
investment risks, ensure viable returns on property investment and prescribe desirable 
land uses, (Wolpe, et al,. 2008).  
To the private sector, a tax incentive means undertaking urban regeneration projects in 
discrete zones of decline at discounted costs thus achieving the commercial objectives 
and contributing to the social objectives of government.  It should be noted though 
that the private sector will not commit to the additional responsibilities that come with 
regeneration projects unless there is sufficient reward (IPF, 2009). Ngwabi (2009) goes 
on to argue that although applying a tax incentive means that the public sector is 
compromising a portion of potential tax revenue that would have accrued to its income 
base, it has a long-term benefit to the public sector by enhancing and encouraging 
urban regeneration. 
Tax incentives can take various forms and be called by various names in different 
countries. The more commonly used names are empowerment zones, enterprise zones 
or urban development zones. In essence there is no fundamental difference in the 
underlying model of regenerating an area by reducing taxes or providing tax benefits to 
businesses or tax payers. Enterprise zones programs, for instance, designate specific 
areas as “zones” that qualify for lower taxes and in some cases less government 
regulation (Hirasuma and Michael, 2005).  The theory behind enterprise zones is that 
allowing free uninterrupted enterprise within a zone creates economic growth (ibid.). 
Empowerment zones are designated areas that receive tax incentives and grants from 
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the American federal government under the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise 
Communities Act of 1993, (ibid.). Enterprise zones are a state engineered and managed 
program whereas empowerment zones fall under the auspices of federal government 
(O’Keefe and Dunstan, 2001). Urban development zones on the other hand are 
designated areas where tax payers who invest within the zone receive tax allowances 
(City of Johannesburg, n.d). 
Ngwabi (2009) refers to tax incentives as ‘pull factors and self-financing tools’ as they 
encourage exogenous investment to locations and encourage owners of private 
buildings to renovate them. Hirasuma and Michael (2005) comment that areas that are 
designated as requiring tax incentive intervention are usually those areas with high rates 
of unemployment, lower incomes, fewer jobs or fewer good paying jobs, unused land 
and blighted structures. 
2.3.2.1 The Economic Theory of Enterprise Zones 
Economic theory suggests that lowering taxes will raise aggregate income (Hirasuma 
and Michael, 2005) hence reducing the state’s revenue base.  The reverse side of 
providing zone incentives is that this reduction in tax revenue could result in cut -backs 
in the provision of public services or assets (ibid.).  Ngwabi (2009) contends that the 
theory of enterprise zones is built on the justifiable assumption that the provision of tax 
incentives within a particular zone is a more cost effective way of regenerating the area. 
Therefore, the benefit of regeneration out-weighs the cost of the reduction in expected 
income for the exchequer. 
The tax incentives need to be large enough to induce the desired investment behaviour. 
In deciding whether to invest or locate in a particular zone, a business will weigh the 
value of the tax incentive against the higher cost of investing and operating within a 
zone location (Hirasuma and Michael, 2005). In other words, businesses will weigh 
location factors against the tax incentives within a zone before they can decide whether 
or not to locate within a particular area. 
2.3.2.2  Enterprise Zones (EZ) in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The idea for the use of enterprise zones in the UK can be credited to Peter Hall. Hall 
(Hirasuma and Michael, 2005) attributed the rapid economic growth of the free ports of 
Asia, (Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) to low taxes and government intervention, 
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and proposed the use of this model in poor neighbourhoods in an effort to resurrect 
them (ibid.). This saw the enactment of the first enterprise zone in 1981 in the Isle of 
Dogs in London’s Docklands (ibid.). The enactment of these zones encouraged new 
investors or occupiers to locate in deprived areas by offering exemption from business 
rates, 100% allowances for corporation and income tax purposes for capital expenditure 
on new and unused industrial and commercial buildings and simplified planning regime, 
(IPF, 2009). From their inception in 1981 till their end in 2006, approximately 38 
enterprise zones were enacted in the UK, (ibid.). The management of each zone was 
administered by a zone authority, (local authority) or development corporation (Potter 
and Moore, 2000). 
2.3.2.3 Features of Enterprise Zones (EZ) in the United Kingdom (UK) 
With the background of attracting private sector investment in deprived areas, 
enterprise zones were created to with the following specific features (Potter and Moore, 
2000): 
 Exemptions of property from local business rates; 
 Enhanced capital allowances against corporation and income tax liabilities for 
investment in property; 
 Exemption from Development Land Tax (this was levied until March 1985 on 
the development value realised from disposals of land in an EZ); 
 Exemption from Industrial Training Board levies; 
 Simplified planning regime (setting out the types of development for which 
planning permission is deemed to be granted); 
 Faster administration of planning and other decisions; 
 Relaxed criteria for applications for customs facilities (which exempt businesses 
from customs duties on re-exported goods); and 
 A reduction in requirements to respond to government statistical enquiries. 
Enterprise zones were primarily enacted to attract inward investment, create jobs and 
facilitate physical and economic regeneration of deprived areas. Each of the 38 zones 
was created to achieve specific regeneration results, for example in Telford the 
emphasis was to attract inward manufacturing investment; in Dudley and Newcastle 
there was a strong focus on new retailing and leisure activity; and in the Isle of Dogs 
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(London) commercial activity was encouraged; the Tyneside EZ on the other hand was 
created to attract mobile investment (Tyler, 1993 in Potter and Moore, 2000).  
Two separate studies carried out by PA Cambridge Economic Consultants in 1987 and 
1995 respectively indicate that enactment of EZ’s in the UK was a successful 
regeneration strategy and contributed to increase in economic activity and job creation 
(Potter and Moore, 2000). This study was carried out using survey date from a 
government sponsored national evaluation and the results showed that job creation in 
EZ’s was approximately one-third higher compared to other areas. However, the 
research also pointed out that in the long run, the zones could not be conclusively said 
to contribute to sustained inward investment (ibid.). 
2.3.2.4 Enterprise Zones in the United States of America (USA) 
The driving force of urban poverty in the USA was believed to be caused by the flight 
of influential families and businesses from the inner city to the suburbs. This flight led 
to pockets of blight or decay being left in the inner city. In the USA, the theory behind 
the introduction of enterprise zones as a regeneration strategy is similar to that in the 
UK. In the USA, it was assumed that blighted neighbourhoods could be saved by the 
resuscitation of small businesses via reduction in taxes and lesser government control. 
This would in turn have a spiral effect in that the businesses would be revived and 
would be able to offer employment to the local community and this in turn would lift 
the livelihood of the community. To counter the problem of urban decay, enterprise 
zones were introduced through the enactment of the Urban Development and 
Enterprise Zone Act in 1981. This Act was enacted principally to attract new business 
into the inner cities.  According to Butler (1982), EZ’s were seen as a tool to save 
blighted neighbourhoods by stimulating businesses and economic activity through the 
reduction of taxes and government regulation. From 1980 to 1984 over 14 enterprise 
zone bills, each with its’ own version of tax incentives and regulatory reductions were 
introduced in the USA Congress, (Hirasuma and Michael, 2005).  
Similar to the EZ in the UK, the zones are managed by a designated authority, for 
example California's enterprise zone program is overseen by the Technology, Trade and 
Commerce Agency, (O’Keefe and Dunstan, 2001). Further this agency formed the 
California Association of Enterprise Zones (CAEZ) in which the state and participating 
businesses cooperate to find ways to enhance the overall effectiveness of the zone 
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program, (ibid.). This integration of the public and private sector to improve an EZ area 
is a feature that is unique to the USA concept. For an area to be designated as an EZ, it 
must show signs of general distress (population decline, poor health and safety 
conditions), high unemployment rates, underdevelopment (lack of building permits and 
licenses) and general blight, (O’Keefe and Dunstan, 2001).  
Some of the enacted enterprise zones include: Michigan’s Renaissance Zone, 
Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity Zone,  Minnesota’s Job Opportunity Building 
Zone and California Enterprise Zone, (Hirasuma and Michael, 2005; O’Keefe and 
Dunstan, 2001).   
In an effort to investigate the impact of the introduction of EZ’s, Bondonio and 
Engberg (1999) used local employment creation as a measure. In this study, five states 
were taken as case studies: California, Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia 
respectively. The findings of this research indicated that the there was no marked 
increase in local employment in the selected five states. The researchers pointed out 
that this can be attributed to a number of factors and should not be viewed as implying 
that EZ’s have not been successful. The main contributory factor to this finding was 
that EZ’s promote new business start-ups and resuscitation of old businesses but might 
not necessarily result in growth in local employment as most of these businesses might 
not be labour intensive.   
2.3.2.5 Features of EZs in the USA 
O’Keefe and Dunstan (2001) cite the following as benefits that accrue to businesses 
that are located within an EZ: 
 Tax credit for sales and use tax paid on manufacturing equipment purchased 
during the tax year, 
 Tax credit for hiring qualified employees; 
 Carryover of 100% of the net operating loss for losses associated with operations 
within the zone; 
 Deduction of interest earned by lenders who loan money to zone businesses; 
 Expensing rather than amortizing equipment used within the zone. This allows 
full deduction within a single year rather than over useful life of the equipment 
and; 
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 Preference selection is given to businesses located within an EZ when they bid 
on state contracts 
Unlike in the UK, EZ’s are still being actively used in the USA as a regeneration 
strategy to curb urban decay.  
2.3.2.6  Enterprise Zones in Ireland 
In Dublin a similar tax incentive was used to reduce the negative effects of urban decay. 
This was done under two pieces of legislation: The Urban Renewal Act of 1986 and the 
Finance Act of 1986 (Berry and McGreal, 1996; Williams, 2006). According to Williams 
(2006), the main outline of the Urban Renewal Act was to establish the designation of 
areas for special incentives with the aim of revitalisation of those parts of the city, the 
stimulation of investment in the construction industry and expansion of employment. 
The Finance Act on the other hand enabled investors, owners and occupiers of new 
and refurbished commercial and residential developments undertaken within a specified 
time frame to qualify for a range of fiscal incentives (Berry and McGreal, 1996). 
Collectively these Acts aimed at improving the physical fabric, promoting economic 
development and facilitating job creation (ibid.). 
The incentive was tailored to offer benefits for development and occupation of 
property. Williams (2006) summaries the main provisions of the incentive as follows: 
 Taxation allowances in respect of expenditure of a capital nature for the 
construction or reconstruction of commercial buildings to be set off against 
income or corporation tax; 
 A double rent allowance, which occupiers could set off against trading income for 
a period of 10 years for new leases on commercial buildings; 
 Remission of rates for a 10-year period; 
 Income tax relief for owner-occupiers of residential units newly built or 
refurbished; 
 Taxation relief for investors in rented residential property within specified lot 
sizes; and 
 A reduced corporation tax of 10%, which would apply to licensed companies 
involved in international financial services located in the International Financial 
Services Centre (IFSC).  
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Two of the areas where the implementation of this incentive has been successful are 
Customs House Docks (Gathan, 1993 in Berry and McGreal, 1996) and the Temple Bar 
Quarter (Davies and Prendergast, 1995 in Berry and McGreal, 1996).  
A study to investigate the impact of EZ’s in Dublin indicated that the lowered taxes in 
designated zones contributed to increase in physical improvement of the areas and 
increase in site and rental values (Williams, 2006). The view that tax incentives have 
been successful in Dublin is echoed in the 1996 study carried out by Berry and McGreal 
though no conclusive parallel was drawn between tax incentives and job creation (Berry 
and McGreal, 1996). 
2.4 Evolutionary Context of Johannesburg 
Johannesburg, commonly called ‘The City of Gold – Igoli’ is the provincial capital of 
Gauteng, the major industrial hub of South Africa contributing some 16-20% of the 
National Gross Product and remains a city alive with an array of possibilities (City of 
Johannesburg, n.d) It is the financial and economic capital and is viewed as the 
powerhouse of South Africa (City of Johannesburg, 2004). The Census of 2001 
estimated the City’s population at 3.2 million, growing at an average of 4,1% per year 
(City of Johannesburg; IDP Draft 2010). 
Johannesburg was established around 1886 with the discovery of gold in the 
Witwatersrand reef. Prior to that it was a bushveld inhabited by approximately 200 
inhabitants (Fraser, 2008). The discovery of gold led to the ‘Gold Rush’ a term 
commonly used to refer to mass migration of companies and people to different parts 
of the country and neighbouring countries in search of gold and people to provide 
labour. The population explosion in Johannesburg resulted in the establishment of 
human settlements around the gold mines.  
The first ‘unofficial township’, Marshalltown, was laid out in late September 1886 by 
the pioneer Henry Brown Marshall (Fraser, 2008). The first mining camp was laid out 
on the adjacent farm, Randjeslaagte, consisting of two separate strips of blocks each 
with its own grid plan (ibid.). This sparked the use of the grid system in the laying of 
Johannesburg CBD. Although not the intended purpose, the use of the grid system in 
the laying of Johannesburg city became the cornerstone of some of the country’s 
modern urban planning. 
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The discovery of gold meant that large mining corporations such as Anglo Gold and 
De Beers Consolidated Mines lead by Cecil John Rhodes and Barney Barnato had to set 
up headquarters and offices in Johannesburg. These were accompanied by large 
insurance and pension fund institutions to provide financial support. This 
establishment of commerce and trade aided Johannesburg to emerge as the largest 
financial capital in Southern Africa.  
The growth of Johannesburg was based on the orthodox town planning principles of 
the early 20th Century as practised in Europe and America’s cities. Sound land-use 
management was introduced in the 1970’s to complement the planning regulations 
administered by the Johannesburg Municipality. It is important to note that the practice 
of racial exclusivity through the various legislative instruments impacted on the physical 
and socio-economic development of the City and may well have predicated its post-
apartheid city development trends, in particular the demographic shifts and racial 
profile of suburbs including that of the Central Business District. A number of planning 
regulative frameworks such as parking controls were promulgated and put in place to 
control orderly spatial development of the inner city. 
The advent of multi-racial democracy in 1994 which brought with it freedom of 
movement was viewed by many corporations with pessimism. This historic evolution 
led to an influx of people in the CBD leading to traffic congestion, lack of adequate and 
secure parking, poor urban management, deregulation and high levels of crime (City of 
Johannesburg, 2004). Effectively the unintended consequences of democracy resulted 
in an exodus of large businesses to satellite areas/towns located on the fringe of 
Johannesburg such as Sandton, Rosebank, Parktown, Randburg, Midrand. This exodus 
included the development of Sandton, which has since evolved as the financial capital 
of South Africa. Most of the major institutions including insurance companies, pension 
funds and investment banks now have headquarters in this up-market financial 
conurbation. 
The exodus from the inner city resulted in high vacancies or voids in inner city office, 
residential and retail space; increase in slums and bad buildings and increase in crime.  
This in turn reduced the municipality’s revenue base and made it difficult for them to 
use their police powers to enforce or demand rates collection. This negative 
consequence was echoed by Reid (2005), as quoted by Fraser (2008, p.180): 
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“In the residential areas and the business district of the inner city, 
enforcement of by-laws ceased, and building control, land-use management 
and other planning regulations, along with credit control, were all but 
abandoned. The inner-city housing environment became increasingly 
unstable, with white landlords and the new black tenants in contestation 
over rentals, obligations and rights. Many landlords milked their properties, 
and abandoned them. Banks, facing increased default and a breakdown in 
public service delivery, responded by massive redlining of most of the inner 
city, causing more disinvestment and the self-fulfilment of the banks’ 
prophesy of urban decay”  
This ignited the long process of urban decay, as the Municipality was unable to collect 
rates since the landlords had abandoned the properties and hence was unable to 
provide much needed services and facilitate the provision of an enabling environment 
for the inner city inhabitants and investors.  This, in turn, encouraged more investors 
and businesses to leave the inner city and locate to more conducive suburbs or out of 
town locations that were safer and had more reliable public services.  
2.5 Johannesburg Inner City Regeneration Strategy 
South African cities as with urban areas elsewhere in the world are strategically 
important as they are the most productive sites and house the largest number of people 
(South African Cities Network SACN, n.d). However, these urban areas are 
impoverished and suffer from extensive urban decay (South African Revenue Services 
(SARS), 2008). The primary aim of the City of Johannesburg is to make Johannesburg a 
24-hour lifestyle, world class city by 2030, (Sunday Times 2004; City of Johannesburg, 
2006). The regeneration of the Johannesburg inner city therefore plays a pivotal role in 
achieving this goal as it is viewed as a major productive economic asset (City of 
Johannesburg, 2004). The introduction of the inner-city regeneration strategy in 
Johannesburg is Government’s effort to curb the effects of urban decay and to raise 
and sustain private investment in Johannesburg inner city, leading to a rise in property 
values (ibid.). The components of the strategy are provided on the City of Johannesburg 
website (n.d) as follows:  
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 Intensive urban management, including improvements to service quality, strict 
enforcement of by-laws, management of taxis and informal traders, and sound 
credit control; 
 Upgrading and maintenance of infrastructure to create an environment attractive 
to both residents and business;  
 Support for those economic sectors that have the potential to thrive in the inner 
city, and encourage growth in those sectors; 
 Discourage "sinkholes", meaning properties that are abandoned, overcrowded or 
poorly maintained, and which in turn "pull down" the value of entire city blocks 
by discouraging investment; and, 
 Encourage "ripple effect" investments that can lift an entire area. 
To this end, there have been a number of initiatives that have been broadly used to 
address the concept of urban regeneration in South Africa. These include: 
 Improvement Districts (IDs)  
 Bad Buildings Project (BBP); and  
 Urban Development Zone (UDZ) Tax Incentive. 
2.5.1 ID’s in South Africa 
Hogg, et al. (2003, p.469) summarises the importance of ID’s as follows: 
“whether a district centres, a town centre periphery or a shopping street in 
a village, the advantage of having sustainable funds to spend on local issues 
could be instrumental in changing the fortunes of an area.” 
2.5.1.1 Creation of ID’s 
In Gauteng ID applications to local authorities are considered in terms of the Gauteng 
City Improvement District Act No. 12 of 1997 which was approved by the Gauteng 
Provincial Legislature on 9 December 1997. In some other provinces ID’s are 
established in terms of local authority by-laws.  
Under the Gauteng City Improvement Act No. 12 of 1997, the following are the 
preconditions for the creation of ID’s: 
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 All property owners and major tenants within a defined area must be identified 
and exposed to the proposed intervention; 
 A referendum has to be held and a pre-determined majority must be achieved in 
order to legally establish an ID; 
 Whilst the application to the local authority to establish an ID may be made by 
25%of property owners, final approval will not be considered unless more than 
50% of relevant property owners are in agreement; 
 Once a district is authorised, 100% of property owners within a district have to 
contribute financially; 
 Once legally constituted the ID authorises the council to levy an additional tax on 
ID members who are required to pay them. The levy is mandatory and is based 
on the  land value of the individual stands. It is important to note that unlike 
rates, funds contributed by the property owners may only be spent in the area in 
which they are collected; 
 The council collects the levy on behalf of the ID and pays the money received 
directly over to the ID without deduction or gives agency status to an approved 
agency to collect levies on its behalf; 
 Each district has its own board of directors elected from the contributors and 
they effectively control the district within the terms of their original ID business 
plan. Annual activities and budgets are developed by the CID management 
company who provides a full set of monthly management accounts which are 
overseen by the board. This ensures that the ID is directly accountable to those in 
the business community who pay the levy; 
 The services to be provided by the ID reflect the actual needs of the area and are 
negotiated with the local authority; and lastly  
 An agreement as to the level to which the local authority will be providing 
services out of the normal rates base has to be negotiated. 
The above conditions to a large extent ensure that the ID remains a self sustained and 
independent entity which has the authority to select the level of services above and 
beyond those that are provided by the Municipality.  Membership or involvement in an 
ID is solely dependent on location within a particular area. This is an important feature 
of this regeneration strategy as it makes it open to all individuals; small and big 
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businesses, tax payers and non tax payers as long as they decide to create an ID. This 
fosters the government’s plan of fair franchise to all races. 
The ID is established for an initial period of three years but its life can continue 
indefinitely unless members move for material changes to the original business plan.  
2.5.1.2 ID’s Within Johannesburg Inner City 
There are currently five ID’s in the inner city namely, Braamfontein Improvement 
District (BID), Central Improvement District (CID), Retail Improvement District 
(RID), Benrose Improvement District (BENID),  South-Western Improvement District 
(SWID) and Mall Street Mall Improvement District. Some of these ID’s will be 
discussed in turn below: 
 Bramfontein Improvement District (BID): The main objective for the creation 
of the BID was to re-establish Braamfontein as an area that is well-managed, 
vibrant, physically attractive and well-lit with a growing evening economy offering 
an excellent public environment to the number of corporate head offices 
clustered in the area as well as to the commercial, residential, hotel and restaurant 
sectors. Secondary to the above was the objective of persuading and enhancing 
private investment in the area.  
 Retail Improvement District (RID): This was the third city ID to be established 
in Johannesburg. The RID has been in operation since 1 June 1997 and was 
finally legislated in 2005. It consists of five city blocks in the main retail area of 
the inner city. The RID was established to make this part of the city safe, clean, 
friendly and attractive, particularly for shoppers. The RID includes outlets such as 
Edgars, Woolworths, Game, Truworths, Foschini, Markhams, Green and 
Richards, Lewis Stores, Cuthberts and many smaller retail outlets.  
 The South-Western Improvement District (SWID): This was the second ID 
to be established in Johannesburg. It was established as a voluntary city 
improvement district in September 1996 and was legislated in January 2004. It 
covers 24 blocks in the South-Western part of the city and incorporates the 
Standard Bank Superblock Complex and the head offices of various organisations 
including the Chamber of Mines, BHP Billiton, and SA Eagle. Other 
organisations within the district include the African National Congress in the 
Walter Sisulu House, the Rand Club, Samancor, Anglo Platinum, Anglo 
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Operations, South African Revenue Services, National Union of Mine Workers, 
National Government, Provincial Government, Engineer Industries Pension 
Fund, Peoples Bank Head Office, Johnnic, and many others. 
 Main Street Mall:  This ID was initiated by property owners to see this section 
of the inner city become a real tourist attraction. Firstly, Anglo American 
pedestrianised a section of the street from West to Maclaren. The creation of a 
pedestrian friendly Main Street Mall running from Maclaren to Rissik Street was 
funded by the private sector and the City of Johannesburg. Secondly, additional 
trees were planted and flower beds created in an effort to enhance a ‘green space’ 
environment in an already extremely built up area. The Main Street Mall is 
characterized by the predominance of mining houses that occupy the street. A 
theme reflecting the history of mining in South Africa has been achieved by 
transforming coco pans into water features and having a permanent display of a 
mining train, mining headgear and a steel stamp mill. 
The change in the physical appeal of the above mentioned ID’s shows the commitment 
of the owners and tenants located in the respective areas to improvement and 
regeneration. 
2.5.2 The Bad Buildings Programme (BBP) 
In 1996, the City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality approved a programme 
on Bad Buildings and Other Buildings in Arrears located within the Johannesburg 
inner city. The rationale behind this programme was to provide a mechanism for 
dealing with buildings that were classified as "bad" for a variety of reasons. Buildings 
were classified as “bad” if:  
 They had been abandoned by their owners; 
 They were derelict; 
 They were in a deplorable state; 
 They were  invaded by crime lords and squatters; 
 They were overcrowded; 
 They were contravened various by-laws and other legislation; 
 Market value of the building was below the debt owed to the City; and 
 They were the seat of criminal activities, (City of Johannesburg, 2010). 
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These bad buildings were owned by owners whose priority was rent collection and not 
building maintenance. In 2004, approximately 52 buildings located in the inner city, 
were identified as bad buildings under this programme (Johannesburg Property 
Company, 2004). According to Fraser (2010), less than 10% of these buildings were 
actually made better. 
2.5.2.1 Objectives of the BBP 
The objective of this programme was to facilitate urban regeneration and improve the 
quality of life of inner city residents by making “bad” buildings ‘better”(Davie, 2004). 
To achieve this objective the Municipality tried to recover the debts owed by acquiring 
these bad buildings and selling them to developers and investors at prices that were 
equivalent to the debt owed but, where appropriate, discounted to the market value of 
the property. The driving force of this campaign and the Municipality’s main concern 
was that the owners of such buildings were heavily indebted to assessment rates 
and service charges.  
2.5.2.2 Building Rehabilitation Process under BBP 
The Trafalgar Inner City Report (2004) identified the following six steps as the building 
rehabilitation process under the BBP: 
 Identification of buildings to create a database of bad buildings that were to form 
the basis of the programme; 
 Availability of building for investors to tender and make offers; 
 Adjudication of applications received; 
 Signing of agreement with the potential investor; 
 Acquisition of building from owner and transfer into new owner’s name; and 
 Ridding the building of illegal tenants, write off of debt (rates, water and 
electricity) and beginning of refurbishment process. 
The steps listed above proved to be time consuming, costly and was the causes of the 
challenges that the programme faced 
2.5.2.3 Challenges Encountered 
A number of difficulties were encountered in the implementation of this programme.  
Firstly, the litigation involved in acquiring these buildings and riding them of illegal 
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tenants was lengthy, costly and time consuming. Secondly there was conflict between 
the objectives of the BBP and other Municipal departments that did not agree with the 
concept of selling the buildings at below market and writing off the debt owed. Lastly, 
the objective of the BBP was at variance with the private developers whose objective 
was to obtain a fair return on their investment. To a large extent, the focus of the BBP 
on debt recovery was theoretically sound but proved a milestone to execute. This 
programme has since been discontinued.  
2.5.3  The Urban Development Zone (UDZ) Tax Incentive 
The South African version of the enterprise or empowerment zone is the UDZ tax 
incentive. This tax incentive was first introduced by Trevor Manuel (Minister of 
Finance) during his 2003 National Budget Speech. In his budget speech Manuel argued 
that:  
“Many urban areas in South Africa suffer from inadequate infrastructure 
maintenance and environmental decay. Urban renewal requires greater 
business investment in the regeneration of inner city areas. With this in 
mind, it is proposed that investment in refurbishment or construction of 
buildings in certain urban areas receive special treatment. Taxpayers 
refurbishing a building within designated zones will receive a 20 per cent 
straight-line depreciation allowance over a 5-year period. Construction 
of new buildings within such a zone will receive a 20 per cent write-off 
in the first year and 5 per cent a year for a further 16 years. This benefit 
will be available to owners as users of the building or as 
lessors/financiers of these investments” (2003 National Budget Speech). 
This announcement saw the birth of UDZ’s and the UDZ tax incentive. This tax 
incentive was initially available until 31st March 2009 but this period was extended for a 
further five years until 31st March 2014, in order to encourage and promote more 
investment within the demarcated zones (City of Johannesburg, 2004). The first 
municipalities to be legislated with the UDZ status were Johannesburg and Cape Town 
Metropolitan Municipalities in October 2004 (City of Johannesburg, 2004; Government 
Gazette, 2004). 
 
  
28 
2.5.3.1  Tools to Measure the Effectiveness of Tax Incentives such as the UDZ 
Incentives are seen as desirable regeneration strategies as they make property 
investment more attractive, improve property investor confidence, lower property 
investment risks, ensure viable returns on property investment and prescribe desirable 
land uses, (Wolpe, et al,. 2008).  
Emphasis has been placed on conducting research to investigate the effectiveness of 
the introduction of interventions, such as the UDZ tax incentive (Wolpe et al., 2008). 
Various researchers have indicated that the measurement of the effectiveness of tax 
incentives that are used in urban renewal programmes pose serious challenges.  The 
most challenging aspect being what would have happened in the area if the zone had 
not been created, (O’Keefe and Dunsan, 2001; Hirasuna and Michael, 2005). This is 
because the effects of the zone must be isolated from back ground effects, (Hirasuna 
and Michael, 2005.) and this becomes very challenging. It is of considerable importance 
to realise the challenges involved in separating the effects of the zone from back 
ground effects as it is very difficult to create a ‘control environment’. Hence it is easier 
to investigate the presence or absence of the expected outcomes or effects and use 
these to assess the effectiveness of the tax incentive. 
Literature reviewed has revealed that a number of indicators can be used to measure the 
effectiveness of tax incentives in an area. Firstly, rental growth within a ‘tax incentive 
designated’ area is one of the prominent indicators, (Trafalgar Inner City Report, 2004; 
JDA Progress Report, 2004). Secondly, rental growth is considered to be strongly 
backed by the presence of good quality tenants and vacancy reduction. This view is 
supported by Ngwabi (2009) who attests that there has been an influx of tenants and 
investors to the inner city as a result of change in perception and increase of investor 
confidence. Thirdly, counting the number of building plans passed for alterations and 
new developments within an area can be a useful indicator, (JDA Progress Report, 
2004). However, merely counting the number of building plans approved does not 
necessarily translate into real development in an area so these statistics may not be 
inaccurate. 
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2.5.3.2  Boundaries of the Johannesburg UDZ  
The urban development zone of Johannesburg, in terms of the urban development 
zone tax incentive (Section 13 (8) of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962)) is 
a contiguous polygon comprising broadly of four ‘sides’ (i.e. a northern; eastern; 
southern and western edge). The demarcated boundaries of the Johannesburg UDZ 
inner city as illustrated in fig. 2.1 below are: 
 South boundary: M2 highway; 
 West boundaries: Park Drive, Krause Street & Clarendon Place; 
 East boundaries: De la Rey Street, 1st Street, Albemarie Street & First Street; and, 
 North boundaries: First & Hoofd Streets, Louis Botha Avenue & Pricilla Street. 
  
 Figure 2.1: Johannesburg UDZ boundary 
Source: www.joburg.org.za/udz 
The most important components that provide a vital basis of claiming the UDZ tax 
incentive are:  
 The building in question must be located within a designated UDZ area; 
 The development must be a refurbishment or a new construction; and  
 The costs can only be deducted (the benefits of the incentive) on completion of 
the development. 
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2.5.3.3 Objectives of the UDZ Tax Incentive 
The UDZ tax incentive was introduced with following objectives in mind. Firstly, to 
address core dereliction and dilapidation in South Africa’s largest cities and secondly to 
promote urban renewal and development by promoting investment by the private 
sector in the construction and/or improvement of commercial and residential buildings, 
including low-cost housing units, which are used for purposes of trade (SARS, 2009).  
In addition to addressing urban decay, the introduction of the incentive was seen as a 
supportive tool in implementing the objectives of the Department of Housing's 
comprehensive plan for the development of sustainable human settlements by 
encouraging private investment in affordable rental housing in the inner city 
(www.eprop.co.za). Further, it was seen as a possible catalyst for public-private 
partnerships in mixed-used developments that provide social facilities that are 
integrated into new commercial and residential developments (ibid.).  
2.5.3.4 Provisions of the UDZ Tax Incentive 
The main provision of the tax incentive is that it allows for an accelerated depreciation 
allowance for a taxpayer. 
“There shall be allowed to be deducted from the income of the taxpayer 
an allowance determined in terms of subsection (3), in respect of the 
cost of the erection, extension, addition or improvement of any 
commercial or residential building within an urban development zone to 
be used solely for purposes of that taxpayer’s trade”, (Revenue Laws 
Amendment , Act 45 of 2003). 
When claimed, the tax incentive reduces the taxable income if the taxpayer meets a set 
of development criteria. 
2.5.3.5 Features of the UDZ Tax Incentive 
The tax incentive differentiates between new building construction and refurbishment 
of existing buildings in the manner in which the deductible amounts are commutated as 
follows: 
 
  
31 
 For the improvement of an existing building or part of a building: 
The tax incentive provides for the following deductible amounts in respect of the 
improvement of an existing building: 
(i) Equivalent to 5 year straight-line depreciation or: 
(ii) 20% of the cost of improvement of the building in the year of assessment 
during which the building is brought into use by the taxpayer solely for 
the purposes of trade; and 
(iii) An amount equal to 20% of the cost in each of the four succeeding years 
of assessment, provided that the person does not cease to use the 
building or that part of the building solely for the purposes of trade. 
 For the erection or extension of or addition to a building: 
In respect of the erection of a new building or part of a building or the extension 
of or addition to an existing building, the deductions are computed as follows: 
(i) 20% of the cost of either the erection or extension of or addition to the 
building in the year of assessment during which the building is brought 
into use by the taxpayer solely for the purposes of trade; and 
(ii) 5% of the cost in each of the 16 subsequent years of assessment provided 
that the person does not cease to use the building or that part of the 
building solely for purpose of trade (City of Johannesburg, 2004; 2006). 
2.5.3.6 UDZ Tax Incentive Requirements 
There are six requirements that must be complied with in order for a person to qualify 
for the UDZ allowance in respect of a building or part of a building, (SARS Guidelines, 
2009). These are: 
 Building requirement: This requirement entails that a person must have erected 
an entirely new building, extended, added to or improved an existing building or 
such a building  representing a floor area of at least  1 000 m²; or purchased such a 
building directly from a developer. For properties that have been purchased from 
a developer the following three requirements have to be complied with: 
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(i) The developer erected, extended, added to or improved the entire 
building or a part thereof representing a floor area of at least 1 000 m²; 
(ii) The developer did not claim any UDZ allowance in respect of the 
building or that part of the building; and 
(iii) In the improvement of a building or part of a building, the developer has 
incurred expenditure in respect of these improvements which is equal to 
at least 20% of the purchase price paid by the person for the building or 
part of the building. 
 Location within UDZ: The building or part of the building that was 
constructed, improved or purchased from a developer must be located within a 
UDZ.  The demarcation of the UDZ area is vital in ensuring that the impact of 
the tax incentive is maximised. 
 Trade requirement: This refers to the use to which the building is or will be put 
to. The person who constructed or improved a building or part of a building 
within a UDZ or purchased such a building directly from a developer, must use it 
solely for the purposes of trade and can only qualify for the allowance once the 
building has been brought into use on or before 31 March 2014. 
 Ownership: The building or part of the building that has been constructed or 
improved must be owned by the person claiming the allowance. This means that 
a lessee that constructed or improved a building or part of a building on leased 
property will not be able to qualify for a UDZ allowance in respect of that 
building.  
 Time requirements: Time requirement refers to two dates; namely the 
commencement and trade dates respectively. Development or refurbishment of a 
new building must have commenced on or after the date on which the Minister 
had published the particulars of the relevant demarcated area within which the 
building is located in the Gazette. Where a formal contract is required it must 
have been signed by all parties on or after that date. A further requirement is that 
the purchase agreement must have been concluded on or after 8 November 2005.  
 Location certificate: Lastly, the person claiming the allowance must obtain a 
location certificate from the relevant municipality or a UDZ 3 certificate from a 
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developer where applicable. The location certificate is a confirmation from the 
municipality that the building is located within a UDZ. In addition to the 
aforementioned, the UDZ 3 certificate must confirm that the developer has not 
claimed any benefits in terms of tax incentive.  The figure below summaries the 6 
steps highlighted above. 
  
Figure 2.2: Six requirements necessary to qualify for UDZ tax incentive 
Source: SARS Guidelines, 2009 
The Investors Guide (2006) provides further criteria for the conditions which would 
entitle the developer or investor to qualify for tax incentives. However, these are 
materially similar to the six conditions identified above.  
2.5.3.7 UDZ Application Process 
The process that a taxpayer will have to follow once he/she has met the requirements 
as set out in the preceding paragraphs is illustrated in the figure 2.3 below: 
2.5.3.8 Ineligibility to Claim for UDZ Allowance 
A person will not be eligible for the UDZ allowance in respect of a building or part of a 
building if:  
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 Any of the six requirements are not complied with; 
 The person ceased to use the building or part thereof solely for purposes of that 
person’s trade during a previous year of assessment; 
 The building or part of a building has been disposed of by the person during any 
previous year of assessment, or  
 The notice in which the particulars of an area demarcated by a municipality were 
published has been withdrawn by the Minister. 
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Figure 2.3:  UDZ Application Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure: 2.3 UDZ Application Process 
Source: City of Johannesburg, n.d 
2.5.3.9 Claimable Costs versus Non-Claimable Costs  
There are various costs related to a new construction and or refurbishment, however 
not all of these costs can be claimed under the UDZ allowance, (Investor’s Guide, 
2006).  Table 2.1 shows the claimable and the non- claimable costs. 
 Complete UDZ Registration Form from Council 
In case of new build and/or any 
planning approvals required 
(say consent use, change in 
bulk, etc outside relevant 
planning schemes) 
In case of new builds & 
refurbishments 
In case of refurbishments requiring 
submission of building plans (or where 
the original Certificate of Occupancy no 
longer exists and building plan approval 
is not strictly required in terms of the 
nature of refurbishment, but where the 
taxpayer intends to claim the incentive 
 
Submit application for planning 
approval to council 
 
Submit application for building plans 
approval to council 
 
Approvals obtained from council 
Building refurbishments/construction completed by tax payer 
 
Tax payer receives certificate of occupancy from council 
Taxpayer completes Application for Location Certificate from Council and receives 
authorised Location Certificate from Council 
 
Taxpayer completes relevant SARS form from local tax office 
 
Taxpayer submits Certificate of Occupancy + Location Certificate + SARS Form + tax return 
in respect of affected property to SARS 
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Table 2.1: Claimable and non-claimable costs  
Costs which can be claimed Costs which cannot be claimed 
Construction work Purchase price of land 
Architect & approval fees Transfer duties 
Demolishing of existing building/part of an old 
building 
Borrowing or financing charges 
Structures to provide: water, power, sewerage, 
drainage, waste disposal, access to building, 
parking or security 
Transfer and related costs 
Sidewalks  
Landscaping as part of the development  
  
2.6 Summary 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that urban decay is not unique to South Africa 
but is a common problem worldwide. Governments have implemented various 
strategies aimed at curbing and regenerating areas that have fallen prey to this vice. ID’s 
and tax incentives are the major strategies that have been employed worldwide and 
these are discussed in this chapter.  
The influence of apartheid had an effect on the evolution of South African cities and 
Johannesburg in particular. Johannesburg developed from a mining town, to an 
apartheid city and now the economic powerhouse of the country. Regeneration of the 
inner city of Johannesburg is an important aspect in the Municipality’s goal of being a 
’24-hour lifestyle city’ (City of Johannesburg, 2004). This is because the inner city is 
viewed as an economic asset that contributes considerably to Johannesburg’s gross 
domestic product (ibid).  
In this respect, a number of strategies have been used to regenerate the inner city. This 
research discusses three of these strategies: ID’s, BBP and UDZ tax incentive. In light 
of the literature reviewed, it is evident that despite having specific implementation 
methodologies, these strategies are not mutually exclusive and can be used collectively 
to regenerate the inner city. The Johannesburg inner city is a designated urban 
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development zone. Within this zone are improvement districts in which desolate 
buildings have been targeted for improvement.  
The literature reviewed shows that ID’s as a regeneration concept entail that the 
property owners in a particular area pay an extra amount of money to cater for services 
not provided for by the local authority. One major advantage of ID’s is that they 
provide a positive identity to an area. There are approximately five ID’s in 
Johannesburg inner city. These are Retail ID, Braamfontein ID, Main Street ID, South 
Western Benrose ID and Central ID respectively. 
The implementation of BBP was twofold: to change the physical outlook of desolate 
buildings and for the local authority to recover monies owed by heavily indebted 
buildings. These buildings were identified and sold to potential investors at discounted 
prices. This exercise proved to be a highly challenging venture owing to the litigation 
involved in the process of writing off the debts and selling the buildings.  
The UDZ tax incentive was legislated by way of insertion of section 13 (8) of the 
Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) to provide for the accelerated depreciation 
allowance provided for developers who develop or refurbish buildings within a UDZ 
area. When claimed, the tax incentive reduces the taxable income if the taxpayer meets a 
set of development criteria as stipulated in the SARS Guidelines.  
Literature reviewed showed that it is difficult to assess the impacts or effects of the 
introduction of a tax incentive such as the UDZ in an area. This is because it is difficult 
to separate the effects of the zone from ‘background’ effects within the area. The main 
challenging question being how do we differentiate what would have happened in the 
zone had the incentive not been introduced. 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology used to achieve the research 
questions set out in chapter 1. This is done by discussing the specific research strategy 
used, the methods of research and finally the tools and techniques of data collection 
and analysis.  
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Chapter Three – Research Design and Methodology 
 
“A study has to be involving, it has to be fun and it has to exercise your creative thinking”, Richard 
Branson 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research strategy, the research methods, the tools and 
techniques of data collection and data analysis used to test the hypotheses. The 
hypothesis of the research is: 
 ‘The introduction of the UDZ tax incentive has had no positive impact on property 
 development in Johannesburg inner city.’ 
In addition, this chapter explains the benefits of the particular research strategy selected 
giving reasons why this strategy is considered appropriate for the study. Further, the 
chapter also discusses how primary and secondary data was collected, the criterion used 
in selecting the research sample, the method used in data analysis and lastly highlights 
the limitations of the study. 
3.2 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is defined by Naoum (2008) as the way in which the research 
objectives can be questioned. There are eight types of research strategy that can be 
used.  Denscombe (2008) highlights these strategies as follows:  
 Surveys; 
 Case studies; 
 Experiments; 
 Ethnography; 
 Phenomenology; 
 Grounded theory; 
 Mixed methods; and 
 Action research. 
These approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses and may be applied in 
different situations depending on the research objectives and strategy. The choice of the 
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research strategy depends on the type of the research and availability of information. 
For instance the experiment approach is most appropriate in scientific enquiry where 
the researcher is carrying out an in-depth study under a controlled environment. Since 
the study is aimed at sourcing views, opinions, perceptions and attitudes expressed by 
respondents, survey was considered the most appropriate research strategy. 
3.2.1 Survey Strategy 
Surveys are the most popular research strategy and offer a particular approach to 
research.  Denscombe (2008) highlights the following as characteristics of the survey 
strategy: 
 Wide and inclusive: This means a survey should take a holistic view to the 
research; 
 Specific point in time: This entails that all aspects being investigated should be 
within the same time frame and should relate to the present state of affairs; and 
lastly 
 Empirical research: This is the requirement for a set of details and facts that have 
to be verified.  
This study seeks to investigate the perceptions of stakeholders of the concept of the 
UDZ tax incentive paying particular attention to its objectives and method of 
application. Johannesburg being the economic powerhouse of South Africa ranks itself 
as an important city with regeneration of its inner city being of crucial importance, 
hence the introduction of various regenerations strategies. The UDZ tax incentive is 
one of these strategies. This incentive aims at regenerating the inner city by enhancing 
and encouraging private sector development. The data reviewed in the preceding 
chapter highlights certain aspects of the applicability of the tax incentive that may act as 
barriers to entry hence preventing certain groups from taking full advantage of this tax 
allowance.  
3.3 Methods of data collection 
There are two primary sources of data and these are secondary data and primary data. 
Secondary data is a form of desktop survey and refers to documented data sourced 
from books, journals, government publications and official statistics, municipality 
records, publications by professional bodies, company records, newspapers and 
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magazines, website pages and the internet. One of the main advantages of a desktop 
study is that data sources are easily accessible and available in the public domain except 
for company reports that are prepared for in-house use. In contrast primary data is 
collected first hand from the respondents. Primary data can be collected principally by 
means of postal questionnaires, internet surveys, face to face interviews, telephone 
interviews and observations. 
The methods of data collection that were used in this study were: 
 Documentary sources; 
  Expert opinion interviews; and 
  Structured questionnaires.  
Expert opinion interviews involve interaction between the researcher and the sampling 
frame and are used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data.   
Denscombe (2008) and Naoum (2008) have identified three forms of interviews: These 
are: structured, semi-structured and unstructured. Semi-structured interviews were used 
as the preferred method of sourcing information. This type of interview uses ‘open’ and 
‘closed-ended’ questions and permits the researcher to collect more in-depth responses, 
(Denscombe, 2008). Telephone interviews were avoided as they prevent the close 
interaction between the researcher and the sampling unit. 
The main distinguishing feature between interviews, documents, questionnaires and 
even observation is that ‘questionnaires rely on written information supplied directly by 
people in response to questions asked by the researcher (Denscombe,2008). The 
questions within the questionnaires were split into two broad categories: factual 
questions and opinions. The factual questions in the questionnaire required the 
respondents to select from a range of opinions supplied while open questions enabled 
the respondents to express their opinions. In the words of Denscombe (2008, p. 166), 
the main advantage of open questions is that ‘the response is more likely to reflect the 
full richness and complexity of the views held by the respondent’.  
The risk of open-ended questions is that respondents tend to easily drift away from the 
question. To keep them on track, the interviewer used prompts and props to guide the 
respondents to provide more information whilst preventing them from diverging away 
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from the question. In contrast, closed-ended questions provide parameters within 
which the respondent can make a selection from a set of probable answers. 
3.4  Data Analysis 
Data can be analysed either qualitatively or quantitatively depending on the type of data 
required and collected. These two methods of data analysis are described below: 
3.4.1  Quantitative Research  
Quantitative research is objective in nature and seeks to make an inquiry into social or 
human problems. Creswell (1994, cited in Naoum, 2008) defines a quantitative research 
as one that is based on testing a hypothesis or theory which is composed of variables, 
measured with numbers and analysed with statistical procedures. This is done in order 
to establish whether the hypothesis or theory holds true. Bouma and Atkinson (1995 
cited in Naoum, 2008) point out that quantitative data comprises of hard and reliable 
measurements of tangible, countable, senate features of the world. Therefore, 
quantitative data is not abstract. When a researcher seeks to find facts about a concept, 
a question or an attribute or to collect factual evidence and study relationships between 
certain facts in order to test a particular theory or hypothesis, the most appropriate 
research strategy to use is quantitative strategy.  
Quantitative research is associated with numbers as the unit of analysis whereas 
qualitative strategy is associated with words or images as units of analysis, (Denscombe, 
2008). This definition is shared by Naoum (2008) who adds that qualitative research is 
subjective and emphasises on meanings, experiences and description.   
3.4.2  Qualitative Research  
Qualitative research on the other hand is subjective in nature and emphasises meanings, 
experiences, opinions and descriptions. In this respect, qualitative research seeks to 
discover, explain, understand or explore a process and describe the experiences of a 
particular concept, idea or theory.  
This study seeks to investigate the concept of the UDZ tax incentive paying particular 
attention to the perceptions of stakeholders. In this respect, the data collected will be 
based on the opinions, observations, views and experiences of the identified research 
groups. Therefore the data will be analysed using descriptive statistics techniques.  
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3.4.3  Descriptive Statistics Techniques 
Descriptive statistics is the simplest form of analysis which provides a general overview 
of the results (Naoum, 2007). It entails recording of all data collected, coding of the 
data in broad general themes, categorize these codes, identify themes and relationships 
among the codes, develop concepts and arrive at some generalized statements (Naoum, 
2007; Denscombe, 2007).  This grouping of data makes it easier to present it in a 
concise and logical manner.   
Descriptive statistics entails the analysis of data in three main forms: 
• Frequency distribution; 
• Measurement of central tendency; and 
• Measurement of dispersion. 
 Naoum (2007) describes these three forms as follows: frequency distribution involves the 
 classification of data and presentation in the form of  tabulations, bar charts, pie charts 
 or graphs. Measurements of central tendency, on the other hand entails finding the most 
 typical value for the group and can be done in form of the mean, median or mode. Lastly 
 the measurement of dispersion shows how numerical data tends to spread about an 
 average value. 
 Owing to the type of research and the type of data required, frequency distribution and 
 measurement of central tendency will be the main forms of data analysis used. 
3.4.4  Survey Monkey 
An internet-based collector and analysis tool called Survey Monkey was used to 
structure the questions and collect responses from respondents who were not available 
for face- to- face interviews. This software programme is available in the public domain 
and accommodates open-ended and closed-ended questions, rating and Likert Scales. 
The Survey Monkey uses information collected from respondents and codes it 
according to common themes and ideas and classifies it in terms of numerical scores. 
This programme can be used to generate descriptive statistics, i.e. percentiles, mean, 
standard deviations, variance, etc that can be used to analyse and interpret the findings.   
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This internet based software was used because it provided a fast and convenient 
method of getting responses from interviewees. To boost the response rate, 
interviewees were contacted in advance and those that were not willing to meet for 
face-to-face interviews were given the option of completing the questionnaire via 
survey monkey. 
3.5  Population 
 The population for this research includes individuals who work for property 
 development  companies and officials work who for policy making institutions such as 
 local authorities, JDA, JPC and other institutions.  These individuals form the two 
 research groups: property developers and policy markers. These stakeholders are 
 individuals who are knowledgeable about the tax incentive.  In addition, the property 
 developers group includes those who have benefited from the tax incentive and those 
 who have not.   
The aspects being investigated relate to the UDZ tax incentive that was introduced in 
2004 and the developers to be interviewed include those developers who have been 
active in the inner city since the inception of this tax incentive and who have 
undertaken developments between 2004 to 2010.   
3.6 Sample 
Naoum (2008) defines a sample as a specimen or a part of the whole population which 
is drawn to show that the whole is alike. Qualitative research makes use of non-
probability sampling strategies such as, ‘purposive sampling; snowballing and theoretical 
sampling while quantitative research makes use of samples based on principles of 
randomness and probability (ibid.).  
A sampling frame of the possible respondents was constructed. Denscombe (2008) 
defines a sampling frame as an objective list of ‘the population’ from which the 
researcher can make his or her selection.  In this respect, it is important that a sampling 
frame contains an up to date list that comprises the population for research, (ibid.). The 
sampling frame was purposively selected. Purposive sampling refers to the ‘hand 
picking’ of the sample, (Denscombe, 2008). This type of sampling is used when the 
researcher already knows something about the specific people and deliberately selects 
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particular individuals because they are likely to produce the most valuable data, (ibid). 
The respondents were chosen deliberately, based on the following criteria: 
 The special contribution they will make; 
 Their expertise; and 
 The position they hold. 
Purposive sampling was selected because the researcher already knows the target group 
of the research. Since most institutional properties in the inner city are held by private 
individuals and developers, certain challenges such as confidentiality of information and 
access to data were foreseen. To overcome these challenges, the researcher negotiated 
to access a sample of individuals and buildings deliberately selected from institutions 
with whom the researcher has a working relationship.  
Therefore the research sample included: 
 Officials from Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, Johannesburg Property 
Company (JPC), Johannesburg Development Agency, (JDA) (Policy makers); and 
 Private developers who have refurbished or developed buildings in Johannesburg 
inner city. This group included both developers who have benefited from the 
UDZ tax incentive and those who have not. 
3.7 Limitations of Study 
This enquiry is subject to some limitations as highlighted below: 
Firstly, UDZs were introduced to revitalise the urban areas of sixteen (16) of the 
municipalities in South Africa, Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality being one of 
them. The UDZ area within this jurisdiction is known as Johannesburg inner city UDZ 
area and covers an area of approximately 18 km2. Johannesburg was specifically chosen 
owing to its high economic contribution to the gross domestic product of the country 
and potential for growth. Johannesburg inner city is said to have the most decayed 
buildings in the country. In this respect, the limitation of the study to Johannesburg 
inner city was viewed to be adequately characteristic of the other towns in South Africa.  
Secondly, urban regeneration initiatives have cross cutting effects or benefits including 
social, economic and physical dimensions. The broad range of social and economic 
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issues that would need to be studied to measure the impact of the UDZ tax incentive as 
a regeneration strategies are outside the scope of this dissertation. This study solely 
focuses on the physical improvement on the area; 
This study is based on opinions, views, observations and experiences of individuals. 
And although care was taken to avoid biasedness, accuracy of information cannot be 
guaranteed. Further, access to certain information such as financials was deemed 
confidential and could not be obtained.  
3. 8 Summary 
The nature and type of research dictates the strategy to be employed. The aim of this 
study is to investigate the perceptions of stakeholders of the impacts of the UDZ tax 
incentive on property development in Johannesburg inner city.  To achieve this, the 
survey research strategy was employed. This strategy was considered appropriate owing 
to the nature of the study (to explore the views, opinions, perceptions and attitudes of 
the sample unit towards the tax incentive). Both primary and secondary data was 
collected to answer the research objectives. Primary data was collected by means of  
expert opinion interviews and semi-structured questionnaires and internet survey by use 
of survey monkey. Secondary data on the other hand included a desktop study of 
documentary sources. The sample was purposively selected and included officials from 
JDA, Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (policy makers) and developers active in 
the inner city who have benefitted from the tax incentive.  The data to be collected is 
qualitative in nature and will be analysed using descriptive statistics techniques. This will 
include frequency distribution in the form of histograms, pie charts and graphs, 
measurement of central tendency in the form of mean, mode and median and lastly 
measurement of dispersion in the form of standard deviation and variance. The 
following chapter is concerned with the type of data that was collected, analysis of the 
data collected and the challenges that were faced by the researcher in collecting the 
information. 
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Chapter Four – Research Findings and Analysis 
 
“Knowledge is of two kinds; we know a subject ourselves or we know where we can find information 
about it” Samuel Jackson 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter four presents the findings and analysis of the research, the challenges that were 
faced in collecting the research data and the measures that were put in place to 
overcome such challenges. The data for the research was obtained firstly by means of 
desktop survey through the review of secondary data and secondly primary data was 
collected by means of expert opinion interviews and questionnaires. The Survey 
Monkey which is a professional software package was used to design the questionnaires, 
collect and analyse the responses. The same set of questions contained in the 
questionnaire were posed to the respondents who participated in the expert opinion 
interviews to get more depth and breadth to test the hypothesis as set out in chapter 
one.  
4.2 Research Findings 
Survey Monkey, an internet based software programme was largely used in the survey. 
It was used to construct the questionnaires, to collect responses and finally to analyse 
the responses received.   
One major advantage of using a web based survey is that it is a fast and convenient 
method, however if not controlled it can cause delays as people may not be willing to 
answer questionnaires that they know nothing about. In an effort to counter this 
disadvantage and in keeping with the premise of this study, which was to have as much 
personal contact with the interviewees as possible, internet based questionnaires were 
only sent out to respondents who had declined face to face interviews and had 
indicated that they preferred an online questionnaire. A follow up telephone call was 
usually made after a day or so to either remind the respondent or to thank them for 
completing the questionnaire and to clarify any outstanding information. 
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4.2.1 Research Sample 
The sample of respondents used in the survey was drawn from two groups; property 
developers and policy makers. The sample in each case was taken to represent at least 
75% or more of the population size. 
Table 4.1 Sample size of respondents 
Institution Population 
Size 
Sample 
Size 
Respondents Response  
Rate 
Property 
developers 
20 18 14 78% 
Policy makers 12 8 7 88% 
Source: Field survey, October-November 2010 
4.2.2 Justification of Sample Size 
The sample size for the above groups was chosen for various reasons: 
 Property developers: This group comprises developers who are active in the 
inner city and have carried out developments between 2004 and 2010. The data 
on the number of developers or investors active in the inner city was obtained 
from South African Cities Network and the Property Owners Management 
Association, (POWA). These two interest groups deal directly with the 
developers and act as a united voice to represent the concerns of the respective 
members to local authority and other statutory agencies.  
 Policy makers:  This group refers to individuals from the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality, Johannesburg Development Agency, (JDA), 
Johannesburg Region F, Property Owners Management Association, (POMA) 
and the South African Cities Network. This group comprises the major 
stakeholders involved in regeneration strategies at both policy and 
implementation levels.  
As indicated in Table 4.1 above, the sampled population included a size of 18 property 
developers and 8 policy makers. The number of respondents who were actually 
interviewed was 14 and 7 respectively. This resulted in a response rate of 78% for the 
developers group and 88% for the policy makers.  The questionnaires that were used 
have been attached. 
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The data collected from the groups identified in Table 4.1 was analysed under the 
following themes: 
 Perceptions of policy makers of the UDZ tax incentive. 
 Property developers’ perception of the UDZ tax incentive: The UDZ tax 
incentive was designed to enhance regeneration of the inner city by providing a 
tax allowance for the development of property within the UDZ designated area. 
This first part of the analysis of data is concerned with obtaining the perceptions 
of the probable users of the tax incentive. 
4.2.3 Challenges of Research 
A number of challenges were encountered that prevented a 100% response rate. These 
include:  interviewees declining interview requests when approached, others accepted 
and ended up changing appointment times and later not being available. Certain 
valuable information could not be obtained especially from SARS owing to strict access 
to information regulations. Time and monetary constraints created a major challenge in 
conducting this research. However, the response rates of 78% and 88% were 
considered adequate to carry the study further. 
4.2.4 Developments Undertaken 
The UDZ tax incentive was introduced in 2004, approximately six (6) years ago. The 
data collected indicated that the developments that have been undertaken in the inner 
city in the last 6 years have primarily been refurbishments with only one new office 
development. Of the interviewed developers, 9 had undertaken residential 
refurbishments, 4 had undertaken office refurbishments, 1 new office development and 
1 industrial refurbishment. 
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Figure 4.1: Development projects undertaken 
Source: Field survey 2010 
4.2.5 Rand value of development projects undertaken 
The respondents were asked (Figure 4.2) to indicate in Rand value the cost of the 
development projects undertaken. The majority of developments undertaken comprised 
of residential developments with a total cost of development of approximately R2 
billion. The developers’ active involvement in residential developments suggests that 
high demand for residential stock in the inner city was the driving force behind their 
developments.  
R 0
R 500 000 000
R 1 000 000 000
R 1 500 000 000
R 2 000 000 000
Residential Office Industrial
Total Cost
Total Cost
 
Figure 4.2: Total cost of development projects 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
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4.2.6 Eligibility to claim for UDZ Tax Incentive 
Out of the 14 property developers who were interviewed, 11 (79%) indicated that they 
were eligible to claim for the tax incentive while 3 (21%) indicated that they were not 
eligible to claim for the UDZ tax incentive. 
Eligible to claim for tax incentive
21%
79%
Not eligible
Eligible
 
Figure 4.3 Eligibility to claim for tax incentive 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
The developers who are not eligible to claim for the tax incentive were primarily those 
whose business strategy involves developing purely for disposal. They do not hold or 
use the properties for investment purposes. 
4.2.7 Tools that can be Used to Measure the Effectiveness of the UDZ Tax 
Incentive 
Investigating the effectiveness of a tax incentive is considered a challenging task, 
(Hirasuma and Michael 2005). The main task is to assume what would have happened 
in the area had the zone not been created, (ibid). In effect, this entails isolating the 
changes that have occurred from any background effects. 
The ‘tools table’ below was presented to the respondents (developers and policy 
makers). The main tools for the measurement of tax incentives were identified as: rental 
growth, increase in capital values, low yields, strong lease covenants, vacancy reduction, 
increase in the number of building plans passed and improvement of physical appeal of 
buildings in the inner city(Ngwabi, 2009; JDA Progress Report, 2004; Trafalgar Inner 
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City Report, 2004). Respondents were asked to express their opinions about the tools in 
terms of: most effective, effective, does not matter much and does not matter at all. 
Their responses are presented in Table 4.2 below. From the results, fifty percent (50%) 
of both groups indicated that checking the aesthetics of the buildings and the general 
environment within the inner city would be the most effective tool to use. Property 
developers (75%) and policy makers (71%) both indicated that reduction in vacancy 
levels is an effective tool to measure the impacts of the tax incentive.  Both groups 
(property developers 75% and policy makers 71%) rated increase in capital values as 
another effective tool that can also be used. The developers strongly rated low yields as 
another effective tool that can be used whereas only 43% of the policy makers rated 
this tool as effective.  
Seventy one percent of the policy makers rated ‘increase in the number of building 
plans passed as an effective tool to use. This assertion was dismissed by developers with 
the majority of the respondents (67%) indicating that this tool did not matter much. 
One primary reason given by the developers to dismiss this tool (increase in number of 
building plans passed) is that sometimes buildings are approved but the developer may 
not actually proceed with the development. Instead the common view held by property 
developers was that counting the number of completed projects would be a better tool 
to use.  
Table 4.2: Tools that can be used to measure effectiveness of UDZ incentive 
Tools
Most 
Effective Effective
Does not 
matter 
much
Does not 
matter at 
all
Most 
Effective Effective
Does not 
matter 
much
Does not 
matter at 
all
Rental growth 33% 50% 17% 0% 14% 29% 43% 14%
Increase in 
capital values 8% 75% 17% 0% 14% 71% 14% 0%
Low yields 0% 75% 17% 8% 14% 43% 43% 0%
Strong lease 
covenants 17% 58% 17% 8% 14% 43% 29% 14%
Good quality tenants 17% 68% 8% 87% 14% 57% 14% 14%
Vacancy 
reduction 0% 75% 25% 0% 0% 71% 29% 0%
Increase in the 
number of 
building plans 
passed 0% 8% 25% 67% 14% 71% 14% 29%
Physical appeal 
of the 
buildings in 
the inner city 50% 25% 17% 8% 50% 17% 33% 0%
Developers Policy makers
 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
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In summary the respondents consider the following as effective or most effective tools 
that can be used to measure the effectiveness of the UDZ tax incentive: 
 Aesthetics of buildings in the inner city; 
 Increase in capital values;  
 Good quality tenants; and  
 Vacancy reduction. 
Furthermore, the respondents proposed the following as possible tools that can be used 
to measure the impact of the tax incentive: 
 Checking the number of private people who have bought property in the inner 
city and claimed for the tax incentive; and 
 Checking the number of completed projects that have occurred and making a 
clear distinction between refurbishments and new builds. 
4.2.8 Reasons for Investing in an Area 
The researcher sought to investigate what reasons compelled developers to invest in a 
particular area (Table 4.3). Approximately 92% of the respondents ranked land costs 
and rental growth or occupier demand as the most compelling factors that make them 
invest or develop property in a particular area. The cost of the land or property is 
usually the largest component of the total capital outlay in either a green or brown field 
development.  In this respect, a well-negotiated purchase price in essence means a lower 
capital outlay. Also capital growth and quality of proposed development were ranked as 
extremely important factors behind investing in any area.  The quality of the proposed 
development will influence the quality of tenants and this will invariably influence the 
cash flows of the development. Good quality tenants, rental growth and perceived level 
of risk will result in increased capital values. Long term sustainability of projects and tax 
allowance were both ranked as important factors.  Only 8% of the respondents ranked 
the UDZ tax incentive as an extremely important factor in their development decision 
making process.  
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Table 4.3: Factors that compel developers to invest/develop in a particular area 
Factors Extremely important Important 
Capital growth/investor growth 67% 33% 
Employment potential/quality of labour force 8% 8% 
Land/property costs 92% 8% 
Long term sustainability of project 58% 42% 
Perceived level of risk 60% 40% 
Quality of neighbouring environment 50% 50% 
Quality of proposed development 67% 33% 
Rental growth/occupier demand 92% 8% 
UDZ tax Incentive 8% 92% 
 Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
 
4.2.9 Shortcomings of the UDZ Tax Incentive 
Like all initiatives, the UDZ tax incentive is not without short comings. The developers 
and property consultants interviewed strongly agreed that the major shortcomings of 
the tax incentive were: the tedious and complicated administrative process involved in 
claiming the incentive and the inability to investigate the effectiveness of the 
introduction of the tax incentive (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Shortcomings of the UDZ tax incentive 
  Developers Policy makers 
 Shortcomings 
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Do not 
agree 
at all 
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Do not 
agree 
at all 
Complicated administrative process 67% 17% 16% 71% 0% 29% 
Unrealistic minim threshold of 
1000 m2 42% 33% 25% 43% 14% 43% 
Targets only property as a business 33% 67% 0% 29% 57% 14% 
Does not initiate investment 33% 58% 9% 14% 57% 29% 
Area outside UDZ is still 
undeveloped 17% 83% 0% 0% 71% 29% 
People still ignorant of tax 
incentive 25% 50% 25% 43% 43% 14% 
Works if investor makes a profit 50% 50% 0% 29% 71% 0% 
Does not encourage private sector 
to develop public spaces 58% 33% 9% 71% 29% 0% 
Does not cater for social needs 50% 42% 8% 71% 14% 15% 
UDZ area is too small 8% 42% 50% 0% 57% 43% 
Does not encourage new 
developers or investors into inner 
city 42% 42% 16% 57% 0% 43% 
Difficult to measure success or 
failure of UDZ tax incentive 75% 8% 17% 71% 14% 15% 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010  
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Further, both groups agreed that the areas outside the UDZ demarcated area were still 
undeveloped and the incentive only works if the developer makes a profit. The 
respondents were asked to comment on the extent of area demarcated as the UDZ . 
Forty-two percent (42%) of the developers indicated that they felt that the area was too 
small while 43% of the policy makers felt that this area was adequate. Policy makers 
argued that a large UDZ demarcated area posed administration and management 
problems. Further, it was indicated by the policy makers that the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) actually felt that the UDZ area is already too large. This 
comment was not verified with SARS officials due to SARS stringent access to 
information regulations. Strategies to regenerate an area have to encompass economic, 
physical and social benefits. Appropriately, 71% of the property consultants strongly 
agreed that the UDZ tax incentive does not cater for social needs versus 50% of the 
developer’s group who did not share this view. 
4.2.10 Advantages or benefits of the UDZ Tax Incentive 
Various literature points to different benefits or advantages of the UDZ tax incentive. 
The respondents were asked to rank these benefits. The developers’ group indicated 
that the most important benefit was that the tax incentive aided in eliminating derelict 
buildings (67%) whereas the property consultants’ cohort indicated that the most 
important benefit was ‘the tax incentive for investment’ (43%). However, 50% 
acknowledged that it encourages property refurbishment and development. Although 
property developers held the view that tax incentive is not the sole driver for investing 
in the inner city they are in agreement with property consultants (71%) that it 
encourages refurbishment and development of buildings.  
Table 4.5: Advantages of the UDZ tax incentive 
 
Advantage/Benefit Developers Property Consultants 
  Important 
Not 
Important Important 
Not 
Important 
Tax incentive for investment 50% 50% 86% 14% 
Encourages refurbishments & new 
developments 67% 33% 100% 0% 
Encourages inner city regeneration  75% 25% 58% 42% 
Enhances project feasibility 41% 59% 58% 42% 
Encourages confidence in the inner city 58% 42% 71% 29% 
Eliminates derelict buildings 75% 25% 86% 14% 
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Minimises financial risks 42% 58% 28% 72% 
Creates opportunity for emerging 
developers 33% 67% 43% 57% 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
4.2.11 UDZ tax incentive as a motivating factor to encourage property 
development in the inner city 
The two research groups were asked to give their perception of whether they 
considered the tax incentive to be adequately motivating factor to encourage property 
development.  Both groups indicated that they did not consider the incentive to be an 
adequately motivating factor to encourage property development. This is represented in 
the 67% of the developers who  indicated that it was not important versus  33% who 
indicated that it was important. This is shown in the Figure 4.4 below. 
Is UDZ tax incentive adequate motivating factor to encourage property development
Yes, 33%
No, 67%
 
Figure 4.4: Developers perceptions of whether the UDZ tax incentive is an 
adequate motivating factor to encourage property development in the inner city 
Source: Filed survey August to November 2010 
Notwithstanding this, from the views collected during the survey, it was noted that the 
developers fully acknowledged that the tax incentive has potential  to encourage and aid 
property development. They felt however, that it could be structured in a better way so 
as to ensure that the benefit of tax allowance is enjoyed during the time when it is 
needed most, for example when the developer is making a loss. The developers thus 
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indicated that the UDZ tax incentive was not an adequately motivating factor to 
encourage property development in the inner city as currently structured. 
According to the developers, the ideal structuring of the tax incentive would be to 
increase the depreciation percentage and reduce the recoupment period. This implies 
that the developers would be able to write off a larger amount of their taxable income 
over a shorter period of time.  
Regarding policy makers, a total of 72% of these indicated in the negative with only 
28% indicating that they considered the tax incentive as an adequate motivating factor 
to encourage property development.  See Figure 4.5 below. 
Do you consider the UDZ tax incentive an adequate motivating factor 
to encourage property development
28%
72%
Yes
No
 
Figure 4.5: Property consultants’ opinion of whether the UDZ is an adequate 
motivating factor for property development. 
Source: Field survey August to November 2010 
The reasons given for this assertion are as follows: 
 Firstly, although it is a good value added incentive for developers, it is not 
primarily a driving factor. Other things are needed before the UDZ tax incentive 
can be  considered as a motivating factor such as: service delivery, urban 
management,  economic development, safety and security. 
 Secondly, cognisance should be taken of the fact that most developments usually 
 incur losses in the initial years of trade. According to the provisions of the UDZ 
 tax incentive, the tax allowance can only be claimed once a profit is made. 
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 Developers need an incentive that can 'float' them over the first couple of years 
of loss. An incentive such as rates reductions benefit during the development 
period and in the initial period of trade is considered a more lucrative and 
motivating incentive. This would aid in lowering the development cost. 
 Thirdly, developers decision making process is profit driven and hence they will 
 choose an area based mainly on their expected returns and not necessarily on a 
tax incentive.  
 Lastly, the incentive is viewed as a ‘nice to have benefit’ but it is not a driving 
force and therefore the allowances accruable are not included when undertaking a 
 financial feasibility study. 
To a large extent, both groups agreed that the UDZ tax incentive is a good policy to 
have but it was not adequate to promote or encourage property development. The tax 
incentive did not make property development feasible especially since it is only a benefit 
when the developer is making a profit.  
4.2.12 Other Regeneration Incentives  
The respondents indicated the following as possible incentives that could be used to 
regenerate the inner city: 
 Reduce municipal rates and taxes payable. 
 Rates holidays for 12 months during pre construction phase, (for example plan 
approval phase). 
 Rebates for certain developments especially inner city developments and social 
housing. 
 Give developers concessions on electricity by enabling them to buy it in bulk and 
be able to control consumption in their buildings. 
 Relax planning restrictions. 
 A more inclusive incentive that would help emerging developers. 
 An incentive that encourages developers to develop public spaces. 
 More involvement of public sector to improve infrastructure. 
 Improve urban planning for example traffic and parking in the inner city. 
 Rationalise service charges for low income properties. 
 Public sector to promote safety and security. 
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4.2.13 Time Period of UDZ Tax Incentive 
The UDZ tax incentive was legislated to run from 2004 to 2010. In 2008 this period 
was extended to 2014. The policy makers were asked to comment on this time 
extension. Some 14% indicated that they felt the time extension was adequate for more 
developers to benefit from the incentive whereas 86% felt that this period should be 
extended further. The consensus amongst the proponents of an extension of the period 
indicated that the development process (cycle) is lengthy and there is a time lag between 
project inception and completion. In this respect they felt that more time should be 
given to allow for those projects still in the pipeline.  
4.3 Chapter Concluding Remarks 
Chapter 4 has presented the research findings, the challenges faced in data collection 
and identified the Survey Monkey package as the means of online data collection and 
analysis that was used. The research sample comprised two groups:  property 
developers and policy makers (refer to annexure 1). The population of developers active 
in the inner city was established to be approximately 20. In order to achieve a 
representative response rate, the sampling frame was designed to target about 18 
developers. In the survey, the actual number of developers interviewed was 14. Despite 
this number being lower than the target number, it is considered adequately sufficient 
to provide representative views on which to base conclusions. From the policy markers 
side, a target sample of 8 was selected, however only 7 were interviewed. This response 
rate was also considered sufficient. 
The next chapter discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from the research and 
highlights areas for further research.  
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Chapter Five – Conclusions  
 
“Real knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance” Confucius 
5.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter is presented in the following manner. Firstly a synopsis of the 
research detailing the problem statement is presented, secondly the aims and objectives 
of the study are restated, followed by the research questions highlighting the principal 
findings of the study. Thirdly, the hypothesis as stated in Chapter one is tested and 
conclusions drawn. The limitations of the study are also addressed and possible areas in 
which the study could have been improved are discussed. Finally areas for further 
research are highlighted. 
5.2 Synopsis of Research 
Urban cities world over are viewed as important spaces for production and economic 
growth. These spaces have to be managed and developed in a sustained manner. Urban 
decay is a vice that threatens the core of most urban spaces and is a problem that is not 
foreign to any country. Cities such as New York, London, Hong Kong and Dublin 
continue to strive to control urban decay. South African cities are not foreign to urban 
decay with Johannesburg inner city having the most decayed buildings. Johannesburg is 
known as ‘the place of gold’, and is the economic capital of the country as it contributes 
significantly to the country’s gross domestic product. The regeneration of its inner city 
is therefore an aspect of utmost importance. 
In an effort to curb urban decay, various regeneration strategies based on international 
models have been implemented in Johannesburg inner city such as the ID’s, BBP and 
UDZ tax incentive. The study discusses all three strategies paying particular attention to 
the UDZ tax incentive. This tax incentive was introduced in 2004 as a post apartheid 
regeneration strategy to curb urban decay, enhance development and investment in the 
inner city, (City of Johannesburg, 2006)..  
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5.3 Restatement of Aim and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this research is to ascertain the perceptions of the impacts and challenges in 
the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive with a view of making it more responsive to 
its objectives. From this aim, the following objectives were formulated: 
 To assess the objectives of the UDZ tax incentive and the creation of the urban 
development zones. 
 To investigate what indicators that can be used to assess the impact of the UDZ 
tax incentive. 
 To investigate the types of property development in the inner city as a result of 
the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive.  
 To examine whether the UDZ tax incentive is a motivating factor in the property 
development decision 
The above aim and objectives were achieved by way of literature review and the 
collection of primary data. 
5.4 Evaluation of the Research Questions 
In line with the objectives, the following research questions were formulated in Chapter 
One. These are now evaluated based on the research findings. 
 What were the objectives of the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive? 
The objectives of the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive were as follows: to address 
core dereliction and dilapidation in South Africa’s largest cities, to promote urban 
renewal and development by promoting investment by the private sector in the 
construction and/or improvement of commercial and residential buildings, including 
low-cost housing units, which are used for purposes of trade (SARS, 2009), to develop 
sustainable human settlements by encouraging private investment in affordable rental 
housing in the inner city (www.eprop.co.za) and finally to act as a possible catalyst for 
public-private partnerships in mixed-used developments that provide social facilities 
that are integrated into new commercial and residential developments (ibid.).  
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 What type of property has been developed or refurbished in Johannesburg inner city since the 
introduction of this tax incentive? 
The data collected indicates that the developments that have been undertaken in the 
inner city in the last 6 years (since the introduction of the tax incentive) have primarily 
been refurbishments with only one new office building. Of the interviewed developers, 
9 had undertaken residential refurbishments, 4 had undertaken office refurbishments 
with one new development and 1 industrial refurbishment. This trend indicates an 
increase in the demand for residential space within the inner city. 
 What indicators are appropriate to investigate or measure the impact of the introduction of the 
tax incentive on property development in Johannesburg inner city? 
Respondents were asked to rank the following as possible measuring tools to investigate 
the impact of the UDZ tax incentive on property development: 
(i) Rental growth; 
(ii) Increase in capital values; 
(iii) Low yields; 
(iv) Strong lease covenants; 
(v) Good quality tenants; 
(vi) Vacancy reduction; 
(vii) Increase in number of building plans passed; and, 
(viii) Physical appeal or aesthetics of buildings in the inner city. 
The respondents ranked the following as being the most effective tools to measure the 
impact of the tax incentive: 
 Increase in capital values;  
 Vacancy reduction;  
 Good quality tenants and, 
 Physical appeal or aesthetics of buildings in the inner city.  
In addition, the respondents suggested the following as appropriate measures that could 
be used:  
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1. Checking the number of private people who have bought property within the 
inner city and have claimed for the tax allowance; and 
2. Counting the number of completed projects and make a clear distinction between 
refurbishments and new builds. 
 Can these indicators show whether the objectives of the UDZ tax incentive been met? 
The core objective of the UDZ tax incentive was to foster urban regeneration in the 
inner city by way of enhancing private investment. Since its introduction, there have 
been a number of private developers who have bought and invested in the city and in 
so doing this has improved the physical appeal of the buildings in the inner city. 
Regeneration is viewed as a three legged stool encompassing physical, economic and 
social upliftment. This research has primarily looked at the physical upliftment of the 
buildings in the inner city and has not taken the economic and social issue into 
consideration. In this respect, the indicators show that the objectives of the UDZ tax 
incentive have been met, however this cannot be conclusively stated as the other 
aspects of urban regeneration have not been investigated. 
5.5 Conclusion about Research Findings 
The research reviewed that developers’ decision whether to invest in an area or not is 
profit driven and is based on the prospect of maximum return or rental growth. 
Further, it was noted that the tools to investigate the impact of the UDZ tax incentive 
are in line with the developer’s profit driven decision making process of whether to 
invest in an area of not.  These tools or indicators include  improvement in aesthetics of 
an area and vacancy reduction. These will invariably lead to increase in capital values, 
which will have a positive ripple effect hence increasing the developer’s profit margins.  
The second set of questions asked the respondents to express their opinions about the 
UDZ tax incentive.  
The research findings established that although the developers who are active in the 
inner city have claimed for the UDZ tax allowance, the net effect of the depreciated 
allowance was not considered adequate to initiate development of buildings. Further, 
the developers indicated that they would have undertaken the same developments in 
the inner city even with the absence of the tax incentive. In other words they did not 
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consider the tax incentive as an adequately motivating factor to encourage property 
development in the inner city. Developers are profit driven and the demand for built up 
space in the inner city and potential for rental growth have been the major driving force 
of property development. 
The research established that the factors motivating developers to develop in a 
particular area are largely economic and profit based.  Most developers prefer to buy 
buildings in distressed areas as buildings can be purchased for low amounts hence a 
reduced initial capital out-lay, which translates to increased profit margins for the 
developers. The primary benefit of the UDZ tax incentive is that it allows the taxpayer 
to increase his profits by reducing his taxable income. This allowance however is only 
achievable in the years that the taxpayer or developer is making a profit. This is one of 
the major shortcomings of the incentive. 
The respondents also indicated the need for public commitment in the form of 
infrastructure development, security and urban management as factors that would make 
the tax incentive more beneficial. The view was held that in order for a tax incentive to 
be beneficial, the public service has to provide not only the policy but the infrastructure 
framework.  
5.6 Hypothesis of the Study 
The  hypothesis formulated for this research was tested in light of the literature 
reviewed and the findings presented in the preceding chapters. The hypothesis of the 
research was stated as: 
 The introduction of the UDZ tax incentive has had  no  positive impact on property development in 
 Johannesburg inner city.  
The research undertaken has shown that property development is profit driven and the 
development undertaken in the inner city of Johannesburg would have been undertaken 
with or without the UDZ tax incentive. In this respect, we accept the hypothesis and 
conclude that the introduction of the UDZ tax incentive has had no positive impact on 
property development in the Johannesburg inner city. 
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5.7 Limitations  
The study was not carried without any limitations. Some of the major challenges 
encountered that prevented a 100% response rate include: certain respondents did not 
respond to interview requests and sometimes declined after having initially accepted the 
request. Time was also a major constraint as some of the developers were busy finishing 
off projects before the end of year and hence were not available.  
The researcher realises that the findings are based on a limited sample consisting of 
developers and property consultants located in Johannesburg. Further, the study is 
geographically limited to Johannesburg inner city and excludes the other metropolitan 
cities in South Africa. It is therefore difficult to claim that the results of the study can 
be generalised to the whole country without carrying out similar studies in the other 
four metropolitan cities. In hindsight, the findings of this research could have been 
improved by doing a comparative study on the other cities that have used the UDZ tax 
incentive such as Durban and Cape Town. This would have generally increased the 
sample size and provided a more representative consensus of the perceptions of the tax 
incentive. 
In view of the responses obtained, it is felt that the questions posed were adequate to 
answer the hypothesis. However, the researcher acknowledges that further and more 
refined questions could have been included in the questionnaire that would have 
benefitted the study. Two additional possible measuring tools that were not in the initial 
questionnaire were suggested by the respondents and these are:  
 Checking the number of private people who have bought property within the 
 inner city and have claimed for the tax allowance; and 
 Counting the number of completed projects and make a clear distinction 
 between refurbishments and new builds. 
5.8 Suggested Areas of Further Research 
As with all research work, there are areas of this survey that still remain to be 
researched and observed. Further research should be undertaken to investigate the 
effectiveness of the UDZ tax incentive by drawing a correlation if any between the 
allowances expended to developers by SARS and the actual amount of investment that 
these developers have pumped into the inner city.  The main shortcoming of the 
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incentive as outlined by developers is that they can only claim it once they have starting 
making a profit. This pushes the benefit further into the future.  
A further area of research would be to investigate the impact of the UDZ tax incentive 
in Johannesburg inner city while drawing a correlation between Johannesburg inner city 
and another city that shares similar demographic, social and economic characteristics as 
Johannesburg. 
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